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Social robots are a lesser known technology with uncertain but seemingly very 
powerful potential, which for decades has been portrayed in cultural artifacts as threats to 
human primacy. Research on people’s relationships to non-robotic technology, however, 
indicates that people will treat robots socially and assimilate them into their lives in ways 
that may disrupt existing norms but still fulfill a fundamental human need. Through the 
theoretical lenses of media equation and apparatgiest, this dissertation examines facets of 
robot humanization, defined as how people think of robots as social and human-like 
entities through perceptions of liking, human-likeness, and rights’ entitlement. In a 2 
(gender) x 2 (physical humanness) x 3 (status) between-subjects online experiment, this 
dissertation explores the influence of fixed technological traits (the robot’s gender, 
physical humanness, and described status) and participants’ individual differences on 
humanization perceptions. Findings show that the robots’ features mattered less than 
participants’ individual traits, which explained the most variance in humanizing 
perceptions of social robots. Of those, participants’ prior robot exposure (both in real life 




human-likeness, and perceptions of rights entitlement. Specifically, those with more real-
life exposure and who perceived themselves as more technologically competent were 
more likely to humanize robots, while those with higher internal loci of control and 
negative mediated views of robots were less inclined to humanize robots. Theoretically, 
this study’s findings suggest that technological affordances matter less than the 
ontological understanding that social robots as a category may have in people’s 
humanizing perceptions. Looking forward, these findings indicate that there is an 
opportunity in the design of social robots to set precedents now that are prosocial and 
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CHAPTER 1. DEFINING AND THEORIZING ROBOT HUMANIZATION 
 
Introduction 
Human-robot interaction research is a vast literature on various aspects of how 
humans perceive of and may interact with robots. Until recently, artificial intelligence 
(AI) and robotics has proliferated primarily in the industrial sphere (Arras & Cerqui, 
2005, Taipale, de Luca, Sarrica, & Fortunati, 2015), and so the focus has centered on 
robots’ functionality and appropriateness for certain roles, largely work-related. Part and 
parcel with this question is the concern that robots may replace human jobs. Predictably, 
people have shown a preference to work in a job alongside robots, where they serve to 
augment the human work, rather than have robots perform jobs in place of humans 
(Taipale et al., 2015). Therefore, the approach towards studying robots has largely been 
premised on negative prognostications, emphasizing the ways in which robots may 
threaten people’s livelihoods and disrupt our way of life (Taipale & Fortunati, 2018).  
As AI and robot technology advances, however, more positive possibilities have 
arisen for how robots may fit into human lives in ways that are helpful, rather than 
destructive. Robot caretakers may help fill the gap in end-of-life care; companion robots 
may ease the elderly’s loneliness; robot tutors may deliver personalized education; 
healthcare robots may aid and comfort patients in hospitals; therapeutic robots may 
support autistic children’s socialization (Giger, Picarra, Alver-Oliveira, Oliveira, & 
Arriaga, 2019). While “social robots” (Breazeal, 2004) are not yet diffused, we can see an 




assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa. Humans are fundamentally social and emotional 
creatures, and this proclivity has materialized in how users have adopted and perceived 
Alexa, for example, treating the technology as a friend or companion as much as a 
functional utility (Calvin, 2017). Even in industrial contexts, observational research has 
found that people still socially relate to manufacturing robots (Sauppé & Mutlu, 2015). 
Given the myriad functions they may serve in the future, robots have been studied 
across a number of disciplines: computer science, engineering, psychology, and 
philosophy, under such umbrellas as “human-computer interaction” (HCI), “human-robot 
interaction” (HRI), and more recently “human-machine communication” (HMC). To 
varying degrees, this research has examined the ways in which robots’ functionality — in 
terms of what they look and sound like, how they move, how they speak, how they 
behave — affects humans’ responses to and perceptions of them. These inquiries largely 
still rest on a good/bad paradigm: if a robot maintains eye contact/addresses interactants 
by name/looks less like a human, will people feel more positively or negatively towards 
it? Moving more into the social realm that considers how human-robot relationships may 
take shape or unfold, other questions raised have asked what elicits anthropomorphism of 
robots (e.g., Kidd & Breazeal, 2005), or creates feelings of trust (e.g., Hancock et al., 
2011) and social presence (e.g., Lee, Peng, Jin, & Yan, 2006).  
The proposed research project expands the question of functionality to encompass 
people’s perceptions of and attitudes around robots from a social and communicative 
perspective. Technology has first and foremost been presented as tools to ease humans’ 




technological tool to aid us; in other ways, though, they represent a departure from how 
technology is typically conceived. Specifically, robots’ key functionalities — their 
interactivity and relative autonomy — make them closer to “living” and social entities 
than any technology that has come before them, and make them less like devices — such 
as the mobile phone — that one can directly wield and control. 
Others have already observed the extent to which we emotionally respond to our 
personal communication technology (Vincent, 2015), such that it takes on a much larger 
role in our lives than would some other prosaic tool like a hammer or some scissors. 
People’s well-established tendencies to have emotional and social interactions with 
technology, in combination with robots’ unique life-like features that are designed to 
elicit social responses, present a scenario wherein people might be faced with an 
ontological leap: they logically know and intend to treat robots as tools but are still 
confronted with their social cues that prompt emotional and social responses. A step in 
understanding this dynamic is to include societal-level considerations of normalization 
and humanization.  
To that end, this research proposes to examine facets of robot humanization, 
defined here as how people perceive robots as social and human-like entities. 
Humanization’s inverse, dehumanization, is used to describe the phenomenon of 
ostracization, negative perceptions, rejection, and abuse of out-groups — people different 
from oneself by virtue of certain traits or beliefs, whether race, age, nationality, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, and so on. Robots are already a distinct group from humans; 




Jetten, 2016, Guzman, 2018b, Edwards, 2018, Edwards, Edwards, Stoll, Lin, & Massey, 
2019) to this point has focused on robot acceptance on the basis of the technology’s 
fundamental difference from humans. 
This study, therefore, aims to explore the bridging of differences between humans 
and robots through humanization, conceived as a function of individuals’ perceptions of 
human-likeness and societal assimilation. Specifically, it is interested in studying the 
extent to which perceiving robots as social, human entities might influence broader 
perceptions of how robots could be integrated into human lives, both interpersonally 
(e.g., through perceptions of liking) as well as societally (e.g., through opinions about 
robot’s rights). Looking forward, there may need to be a new kind of learning and 
normalization of how to treat robots in the course of everyday life. These dynamics 
would need to be studied over time — including humanization — but one could imagine 
ways in which human-robot interactions negatively affect human-human relations. These 
might manifest directly, as unwelcome additional interactants or indirectly, as humans’ 
habits interacting with machines cross-over to interactions with other humans. This study 
investigates individual humanizing perceptions of this new technology that is emerging 
and mainstreaming. Capturing these attitudes is key to understanding how far along we 
are in the ontological leap. As such, it offers a cross-sectional example to capture 
perceptions at this point in time, which may give insight to coming trends in social robot 
assimilation.  
Theoretical Framework 




phenomenon of agentic and autonomous technology, which requires further clarification. 
AI and robots are distinct technologies that may, but do not necessarily, share some 
common features. AI programs are engineered to make machines with human-like 
intelligence, so that they can “learn” from their environments and adapt accordingly, able 
to operate on their own without direct human commands (Oberoi, 2019). As the 
terminology “AI programs” suggests, AI need not be physically embodied. Indeed, AI is 
often found in already familiar devices like smartphones, computers, and online chatbots. 
Similarly, robots need not include AI: there are certainly robots that operate 
without its aid, instead acting by pre-existing programming or direct human commands 
(Oberoi, 2019). That said, the value proposition of social robots, the focus of this study, 
is the ability to mimic human-human interactions, to respond autonomously and 
spontaneously to unique and personal situations. As such, social robots must employ AI 
to function. The relevant overlap between AI and social robots is both technology’s 
capacity for autonomy and agency.  
This capacity for agency underpins a key distinction between AI technology and 
other computer-mediated (CMC) technologies: autonomous AI serves as a 
communicative partner whereas CMC technology, as a communicative channel, does not 
(Guzman, 2018a). HMC is focused on “machine subjects with which people make 
meaning instead of through which people make meaning” (Guzman & Lewis, 2019, p. 4, 
emphasis added). This notion of agentic technology that can relate in a more human-like 
way to humans has spurned the development of HMC as new subfield of communication 




both study people’s experiences with different types of machines. The impetus for 
carving out a new space with HMC was to emphasize the relational (rather than 
functional) aspect of communication and the implications therein (Guzman, 2018a). Like 
HCI and HRI, HMC is concerned with the functional and social aspects of interactions; 
HMC also draws in metaphysical considerations — how, ontologically, machines are 
perceived — and considers the ways in which these three aspects of functionality, 
sociality, and metaphysicality might interrelate and influence human-machine 
relationships. The relational encompasses both individual reactions to technology as well 
as the larger milieu in which these interactions occur. The scope of inquiry, therefore, 
spans both micro- and macro-level considerations. 
Given this, the present study looks to two theories developed in the last few 
decades to address technology-specific phenomena: media equation, which provides 
insight into social interactions with machines at the individual level, and apparatgeist, 
which addresses social adjustment at individual- and society-wide levels. The following 
review begins with the media equation to examine how individuals have socially 
responded to machines and the implications of such responses with machines like social 
robots that are designed as intentional social actors. It continues with apparatgeist to 
review how personal communication technology like the mobile phone has been a 
socially disruptive, and considers how social robots could disrupt norms and expectations 
in kind.  
Media Equation Theory: Machines as Social Actors 




media technologies and messages, and that this is an automatic, reflexive, and 
unconscious response. In a series of experiments, Reeves and Nass (1996) demonstrated 
across the board that humans engage with computers and television content as social 
actors: for example, humans adopt social norms such as politeness in their interactions 
and even attribute stereotypes when presented with cues regarding ethnicity and gender 
of the machine (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Moon, & Green, 1997; Reeves & Nass, 
1996). Such behaviors have been identified as mindless rather than active and deliberate 
responses (Langer, 1992; Nass & Moon, 2000). The explanation provided for this 
phenomenon is that we as humans are still operating with “old brains” that automatically 
trigger mental scripts when cued by even small social indicators.  
It is important to note that media equation studies have relied on general 
assumptions about human behavior (e.g., about how we stereotype, interact politely, and 
form groups and affiliate with others) to test whether people apply these same behavioral 
rules to computers. When these same rules are found to be applied equivalently to 
humans as to computers, it is concluded that machines are being engaged with as social 
actors. These assumptions have also been flipped and used to examine how the ways in 
which people interact with technology is indicative of human-human behavior (Nass & 
Yen, 2010). In these analyses of individuals’ psychological responses to technology, it is 
clear that there are fundamental tendencies of human nature — the “old media brain” 
(Reeves & Nass, 1996) — that can be revealed in people’s use of technology. 
The media equation and subsequent “computers as social actors” (CASA) 




offer limited social cues, to which users were not intended to respond socially, and there 
are enough “human cues” to elicit social responses. We might assume that as AI 
technology, including robots, becomes more socially sophisticated, the “human” cues that 
have triggered social responses will only become stronger and more obviously human. 
Indeed, research has replicated media equation findings in human-agent interactions, and 
a few studies have found that the social responses provoked by virtual characters (Appel, 
von der Pütten, Krämer, & Gratch, 2012) and artificial entities are stronger than those 
triggered by a computer.  
However, some research comparing explicit responses to humans versus AI 
entities or robots have not necessarily found equivalent reactions. For example, there are 
interpersonal variations in the extent to which people treated a robotic entity as a social 
actor (Fischer, 2011). Based on a linguistic analysis of the human-robot interaction, 
Fischer (2011) found that the initial opening utterance of the interaction strongly 
predicted the level of social cues in the ensuing interaction, suggesting that one’s 
preconception of the robot had a strong influence on the willingness to socially interact. 
Further, Fischer (2011) found that those who did socially interact nearly always laughed a 
bit before starting, as if aware there was a pretense before engaging.  
While people may instinctually apply social scripts to computer-based 
interactions, recent evidence of interactions with socially autonomous technology like a 
chatbot showed that people responded more socially to a human than towards a chatbot, 
and they exhibit more neuroticism towards the chatbot (Mou & Xu, 2017). So while 




how they treat humans. Mou & Xu (2017) offer two potential explanations for this 
discrepancy. The first is that the chatbot’s artificiality may have interfered with subjects’ 
abilities to suspend their disbeliefs, thereby inhibiting their personalities. The second 
possible explanation is the lack of goals in the chatbot interaction. While communication 
between humans is goal-driven, the same social motivations may not be present with 
chatbots. Thus the lack of prior experience and subsequent uncertainty around how to use 
this emerging technology may limit the extent to which people will be motivated to 
interact naturally with it, limiting the level of sociality in the interactions in turn. 
Further, a study replicating the Milgram experiments, in which a “teachers” were 
instructed to shock “students” up to the maximum voltage, regardless of the “students” 
reactions and protestations, showed that people still differentiated between human 
learners and virtual characters (Slater et al., 2006, Rosenthal-von der Pütten, Krämer, 
Hoffmann, Sobieraj, & Eimler, 2013). Specifically, about 40% of subjects in Milgram’s 
original experiment refused to extensively shock the “student” subjects, while more 
subjects in Slater and colleagues’ (2006) virtual condition were willing to administer the 
highest shocks. Importantly, the subjects’ physiological and behavioral responses were 
“realistic” in that they hesitated before administering higher shocks, expressed 
nervousness, and had elevated arousal levels. The study’s findings suggest both that 
people cognitively distinguish between human and virtual subjects but still reflexively 
respond to a virtual agent as they would to a human (Slater, 2006, Rosenthal-von der 
Pütten et al., 2013). 




dynamics of robot abuse against media equation assumption. In a similar replication of 
Milgram’s study, Bartneck, Rosalia, Menges, and Decker (2005) found that subjects were 
significantly more willing to shock a robot learner to the maximum voltage than the 
human learner in Milgram’s experiment, presenting a challenge to the media equation, 
which would assume similar treatment across robot and human learners (Bartneck & Hu, 
2008). In another experiment, subjects were less destructive and willing to “kill” a robot 
perceived as more intelligent than the less-intelligent robot (Bartneck, Verbunt, Mubin, 
Al Mahmud, 2007). A possible explanation for this difference is that perceiving the more 
intelligent robot as “sort of alive” influenced subjects’ willingness to destroy it, 
somewhat supporting media equation’s premise. However, another explanation they offer 
is purely instrumental: a more intelligent robot may be seen as more expensive and 
valuable, thus raising the stakes of its destruction (Bartneck & Hu, 2008).  
Thus, when testing media equation with more explicitly social machines, the 
findings are more mixed. Of course, computers and other digital interactive devices have 
been prevalent now for more than a few decades. It has been suggested recently that, 
from their accumulated experiences over the years, people have developed human-
machine social scripts for these mediated interactions (Gambino et al., 2020). CASA and 
media equation have long held that people mindlessly apply human-human social scripts 
when interacting with communicative technologies; however, these models have not been 
updated to reflect the passage of time or evolution of communication technologies over 
time (Gambino et al., 2020). Anthropomorphic features — for example, gender, face, 




AI technologies to ape human behavior in order to provide a smoother interaction 
experience for humans (Guzman, 2020). It stands to reason, then, that there might be new 
“scripts” or patterns with which people treat social AI like robots, and some of the 
research reviewed above provide evidence for this possibility (e.g., Mou & Xu, 2017). 
As such, it is important to consider the possibilities for both what media equation 
suggests — that people will mindlessly respond socially to robots — and what an 
evolution of media equation’s premise — that people develop unique scripts for HMC — 
might portend. Practically speaking, media equation and CASA have highlighted the 
need to consider the social aspects of HCI in design. However, they do not extend to the 
larger social and human-human implications. If indeed people over time have developed 
new scripts and interaction rituals with media, this would suggest a development of new 
norms for HMC that may affect the larger social context in which the technology is used. 
This potential for social disruption and assimilation has been demonstrated by the mobile 
phone’s integration and is discussed further in the next section. 
Apparatgeist: Social Implications of Technology in Everyday Life 
Thus it can be asserted that human behavior is not wholly susceptible to 
technology’s effects. Media equation examines human response to technology at the 
individual level, and within the smaller timeframe of a single experimental session. 
Expanding out from the short-term and individual level effects on technology use and 
perceptions, Katz and Aakhus’s (2002) apparatgeist theory asserts that underlying truths 
about human behavior may be revealed through both the technical design and social uses 




takes in society as well as the influence a technology exerts on social norms and 
expectations. A middle way between technological determinism and social 
constructivism, apparatgeist acknowledges the limits and possibilities a technology’s 
affordances place on human behavior, but also considers the ways in which individuals 
wield the technology to fulfill their particular needs. It asserts that behavior and norms 
may evolve to incorporate technology, but this process is driven by human needs and 
desires, rather than being determined by the technological features.  
Apparatgeist was initially developed when examining how individuals interacted 
with mobile phones and with one another through their phones. People’s use of mobile 
phones revealed a “socio-logic” of “perpetual contact,” which illustrated human’s 
fundamental drive for connection and communication, enabled through the mobile 
phones’ affordances of anytime-anywhere contact. The ways in which individuals viewed 
and used the technology — the level where media equation resides — eventually 
culminated to have larger social implications. The “mobile turn” (Caron & Caronia, 
2007, Goggin, 2008, Caron & Caronia, 2015) has affected numerous facets life, from 
how we organize our lives, stay in contact with others, and interact with and move about 
the world. For instance, has the mobile phone has proliferated over time, it has become 
“embedded” in the fabric of society, developing in that process also mutual expectations 
for how we interact with one another (Ling, 2016). These changes have been framed both 
positively and negatively, and their effects on individual well-being and relationships are 
still evolving and being determined (Coyne et al., 2020). 




on people’s lives, particularly in how they have enabled easier and more efficient 
communication. Couples have multiple modes to stay in touch throughout the day and 
express their affection, which enhances relationships (Coyne et al., 2011, Novak, 
Sandberg, Jeffrey, & Young-Davis, 2015). These positive effects are particularly 
pronounced for long-distance relationships, which are easier to maintain through regular 
and closer contact (Marlowe, Bartley, & Collins, 2017; Billedo, Kerkhof, & Finkenauer, 
2015).  
The crux of concerns around mobile phones is their ability to draw people away 
from other human connections. Turkle (2017) posited that attachment to this technology 
detracts from face-to-face relationships in that people exist “alone, together” as they 
attend to their devices, physically co-present but psychologically and emotionally off in 
their own distinct, virtual worlds. The nature of public space has also changed, as people 
prefer the digital world in their phones to the physical world around them (Fortunati, 
2007). This behavior can disrupt in-person interaction even when phones are idle: the 
mere presence of a mobile phone manifests the possibility for an interruption of a third, 
distant, virtual other, a “ghost participant” in any encounter (Caron & Caronia, 2007). 
As time has gone on, norms and etiquette have evolved to incorporate the mobile 
phones’ disruptions, but these shifts have not been without their negative consequences. 
Our perpetual attention to personal communication devices has normalized the “absent 
presence,” which Gergen (2002) termed to describe how absorption in mediated worlds 
renders physical companions absent. This phenomenon has been identified more 




favor of their phone (Roberts & David, 2016). Pphubbing gives rise to conflict in 
relationships, which in turn reduces levels of relationship satisfaction (Roberts & David, 
2016), as well as personal well-being (McDaniel & Coyne, 2014). Further, the “ghost 
participant” can degrade relationships: Przybylski and Weinstein (2013) confirmed that 
even the mere presence of a phone on a table between two people can damage feelings of 
closeness, connection, and conversation quality. 
These phenomena — “alone, together,” “absent presence,” “ghost participant,” 
and “Pphubbing” — demonstrate the “active role of things” (Caron & Caronia, 2015) in 
how the mobile phones, as a symbolic object, shapes human behavior. Perpetual contact 
refers primarily to how technology facilitates and mediates communication; however, the 
mobile phones’ role in social reorganization extends beyond a communication conduit 
towards a third participant in interactions, possibly creating conflict and feelings of 
exclusion and isolation. In a similar vein, some have imagined how social robots might 
disrupt the human-human dyad in interpersonal communication, introducing instead a 
triadic dynamic (Hoflich, 2013) that is particularly fraught in terms of both a robot’s 
capability for autonomous interaction and the symbolic weight a robot might hold in the 
human interactants’ minds. Therefore, though it was initially developed in the study of 
mobile phones, apparatgeist may be instructive in how to untangle the larger social 
implications of treating machines socially. Whereas media equation emphasizes the 
unconscious social response, apparatgeist considers the attitudinal and behavioral 
processes that co-evolve as a technology is incorporated into one’s everyday life.  




diffused widely in the public, and so it is not yet possible to observe changes in social 
norms in the same way work on mobile phones has done. That said, digital voice 
assistants have proliferated fairly widely in the last few years, and their adoption gives 
some indication that these types of autonomous technology are interacted with socially by 
some, particularly regarding its “human” feature — the female voice. An analysis of 
online reviews of Alexa, for example, found that over half personified Alexa; however, a 
majority of reviews still referred to Alexa with an object pronoun (“it”), rather than a 
gendered pronoun (“she”). Those reviews that exclusively personified and gendered 
Alexa were more likely to also report highly sociable interactions with Alexa, compared 
to the reviews of other users that tended to report low- to medium amounts of sociable 
interactions with it (Purington, Taft, Shannon, Bazarova, & Taylor, 2017). Anecdotal 
evidence in journalistic accounts has discussed the rude behavior these devices have 
elicited from their human interlocutors, raising concerns about how children may learn to 
interact socially (Truong, 2016, Metz, 2017).  
Social robots have technological features such as autonomy, interactivity, human 
embodiment, and gender that may prompt social reactions. Established media equation 
findings on how people socially respond to “older” technology such as computers suggest 
that social responses to social robots may be even stronger. However, some studies that 
have explored media equation with robots indicate that people’s behavior may be more 
nuanced than a linear relationship between the amount of a technology’s social cues and 
social responses, which may be related to the ontological leap such social machines may 




functions in people’s everyday use, but also how they integrate it into their social lives 
with other people. Apparatgeist revealed how new social rules and expectations 
developed in response to the mobile phone’s integration. In a similar way, it is speculated 
that the introduction of social robots might result in the emergence of new norms and 
interaction patterns, though this question is not yet able to be studied. Therefore, this 
study explores how people perceive the technology as a first step to understanding what 
its adoption might portend for our everyday lives. Too, it is not expected that such 
technology would be uniformly engaged with, as the research on another autonomous and 
interactive technology, digital voice assistants, suggests (e.g., Purington et al., 2017) — 
certain types of people may be more positively or negatively disposed to the technology. 
The rest of this chapter reviews the technological factors that may influence perceptions 
of social robots and the main research questions and hypotheses derived from these 
factors. The chapter that follows considers the human factors that might contribute to 
these perceptions.  
Humanizing Robots 
 This research is informed by the assumptions of both media equation and 
apparatgeist; namely, that people respond socially to machines and that the ways with 
which people perceive and interact with technology can be indicative of fundamental 
human tendencies. It is situated within HMC, which has a three-pronged research agenda 
to study communication with digital interlocuters through their functional, relational, and 
metaphysical aspects (Guzman & Lewis, 2019). To varying degrees, the present research 





The long-standing concept of anthropomorphism addresses the question of 
humanization to some degree. A robot is “anthropomorphic” when it displays physical 
human qualities; conversely, something is anthropomorphized when the person beholding 
the object (whether inanimate like a stuffed animal or doll or animate like a robot or 
cartoon character) imbues it with human qualities such as reasoning, emotions, 
motivations, agency. In other words, anthropomorphism is a cognitive process of 
projecting and attributing human characteristics towards something (Giger et al., 2013). 
Mind attribution, which could be considered a subset of anthropomorphism, has 
been studied recently with regards to social robots (e.g., Banks, 2019). Theory of mind is 
the ability to understand others’ capacity “to understand, infer and attribute affect, 
motives and goals” just like ourselves (Carruthers & Smith, 1996). Giger and colleagues 
(2019) have argued that perceiving robots as having theory of mind is foundational to 
human-robot interaction, as “it paves the way for the possibility of a common ground for 
interaction” (p. 112). Further, attribution of mind towards robots has also been found to 
increase perceptions of their moral worth and trustworthiness worth (Waytz, Cacioppo, & 
Epley, 2010; Waytz, Heafner, & Epley, 2014). As such, Giger and colleagues (2019) 
have established the term “humanization’ of robots to describe both the physical 
replication of human features in robots and the socio-emotional replication of human 
qualities such as language and personality.  
This study pivots to this broader notion of “humanization” as an ongoing process 




perceive human-likeness) as well as social and ontological considerations (e.g., liking and 
rights entitlement) that will have wider implications for robot integration in the future. 
The question of rights, in particular, addresses both notions of sociality (e.g., how a robot 
is perceived to be able to operate in society) as well as ontology (e.g., how a robot should 
be allowed to operate in society). As Gunkel (2018a, 2018b) lays out, there are different 
ways to approach the question of a robot’s rights: from a normative perspective (should 
robots have rights?) or from a more descriptive perspective (can robots have rights?). 
Thus, there are different criteria that have been proposed regarding various 
thresholds for providing robots moral consideration. Some of the proposed criteria has 
grounding in the animal rights debate and relates to the characteristics of the being in 
question. Others have proposed that the question of robot rights is context-dependent, in 
relation to the human (Coeckelbergh, 2010). Whether or not a robot has rights should be 
considered contextually: how robots appear to humans, and how humans respond to 
robots is important criteria for granting robots rights (Darling, 2012). In this way, robots’ 
rights can be explored sociologically rather than philosophically. How people conceive of 
and perceive robots serves as a reflection of human values and priorities (Gunkel, 2018b), 
which aligns with the apparatgeist perspective that technology use arises from and reveals 
fundamental human tendencies. Salient to liking and rights is our tendency to humanize, 
and conversely in some instances, dehumanize others.  
The term “humanization” is not unique to robots, of course. Its inverse, 
dehumanization, has been studied extensively in human-human as well as human-animal 




stereotype, commit injustices, inflict harm, and deny rights. Haslam (2006) proposed two 
facets of dehumanization: animalistic (in which others are viewed as uncivil and bestial) 
and mechanistic (in which others are seen as instrumental and object-like). Animalistic 
dehumanization is prevalent particularly in studies on race attitudes — for example, 
making implicit associations between black people and apes, which has deleterious 
effects like overestimating black children’s criminal capacity (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, 
& Jackson, 2008, cited in Haslam, 2014). Mechanistic dehumanization has been studied 
more recently and has been found particularly salient in perceptions of people who 
perform instrumental functions and/or are important for achieving personal goals, such as 
a healthcare worker (Haslam, 2014). This process is arguably most applicable to 
technology, including robots, which are typically conceived of as tools invented by 
humans to achieve human ends.  
As described in Haslam (2014), dehumanization is a discrete variable which may 
serve as an independent, mediating, or dependent variable. Because robots are, by 
definition, not human, this study uses the inverse, humanization, to describe a slow-
moving phenomenon that cannot be measured in one cross-sectional study. The social, 
embodied robots studied here are not proliferated yet, particularly in people’s personal 
lives. Even their disembodied predecessors that are currently on the market — digital 
voice assistants — have only been taken up by about a third of the U.S population 
(Petrock, 2019). While dehumanization has been studied cross-sectionally (see Haslam, 
2006, Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016), its targets are primarily other humans, who are 




with humans, and so it seems premature and an overreach to claim to identify and 
describe the process of robot humanization in a single study. Rather, this study is a first 
step to understanding the potential effects of increasingly social and autonomous 
technology in our lives by exploring different (and not necessarily exhaustive) facets of 
humanization: perceived human-likeness, liking, and rights perceptions.  
Perceived human-likeness and robot liking are extant variables that have been 
used to explore people’s general acceptance of robots, and both correspond to the 
functional and relational aspects of HMC. Robot rights is a new measure introduced here 
to expand the scope of acceptance to explore the potential metaphysical implications of 
HMC, which Guzman and Lewis (2019) describe as the blurring of ontological 
boundaries between human and machine. Human rights have been positioned as an 
inherent entitlement by virtue of being a human. Given that robots are not human, 
people’s perceptions of the extent to which they should be accorded rights is an indicator 
of acceptance beyond viewing robots as useful technological devices and instead viewing 
them as social and relational human-like entities. Considered altogether, perceived 
human-likeness, liking, and rights entitlement represent facets of robot humanization.  
Factors Influencing Robot Humanization 
This study considers these humanization aspects as they relate to the quite 
physical and explicit humanizing of robots through their physical human-like appearance 
and gender, as well as their role or status relative to humans. The extant robots in 
development or on the market right now vary in the extent to which they appear 




2018). Further, robots have been proposed to serve in a range of roles: from food 
deliverers, personal assistants, and caretakers to surgical aids and work managers 
(Chamorro-Premuzic & Ahmetoglu, 2016). Inherent in these roles are elements of power: 
the human wields more control over a personal assistant robot than they would a surgical 
robot or manager. As such, this study considers how these components — physical 
humanness, gender, and status — might influence perceptions of robots. The following 
sections review how these robot traits have already been found to influence robot 
perceptions and the gaps in the literature that this study seeks to address. 
Appearance: Perceiving social robots 
There is a long line of research already on the functional aspect of robots: what 
features and mannerisms, modes of interacting and behaviors are more or less off-putting 
(e.g., DiSalvo, Gemperle, Forlizzi, & Kiesler, 2002; Li and Chignell, 2011; Park et al., 
2011; Oliveira, Arriaga, Correia, & Paiva, 2019). Much of these characteristics come 
down to the extent to which robots appear human or how well they can mimic human 
behavior. Physical humanness is therefore an important functional component to 
understanding how people may react to robots. Another aspect of appearance — gender 
— could be an important functional and social component to people’s perceptions of 
robots.  
Physical humanness. A robot’s appearance can take on many forms, and research has 
already extensively examined the influence of a robot’s human-like presentation on 
attitudes towards the technology. Much of this research is premised on the predictions set 




comfortable with robots as they appear more like humans, but only to a certain point. 
When robots appear too similar but just dissimilar enough to humans, people become 
uneasy and unsettled. Specifically, the uncanny valley (Mori, 1970) suggests that there is 
a nonlinear relationship between robot appearance and acceptance, where similarity to 
human appearance increases acceptance among users up until robot appearance reaches a 
point of similarity that instead causes uneasiness among humans (Ferrari et al., 2016; 
Mathur & Reichling, 2016; Mori, 1970). Research suggests that the experience of the 
uncanny valley is in part attributed to the interpretation of human-looking robots (e.g., 
androids) as a threat to human identity and uniqueness (Ferrari et al., 2016; Turkle, 1984; 
Guzman, 2018b). Höflich (2013) maintains that the question of ensoulment of the 
machine enhances the sensation of uneasiness among human users. 
In the numerous studies that have examined the uncanny valley, there is the 
question of measurement, both with the dependent variable (how to conceptualize 
uncanniness), and of more interest here, with the independent variable — physical 
humanness. Various studies have measured it differently, both subjectively and 
objectively. Subjective measurement of a robot’s humanness often relates to how much a 
robot is anthropomorphized or attributed with theory of mind (Wang, Lilienfeld, & 
Rochat, 2015). Objective measurement of humanness corresponds with the amount of 
physical human traits present in the robot’s appearance (Wang et al., 2015). It has been 
found that, in some cases, subjective humanness (how much humanness someone 
attributes to a robot) and objective humanness (how many physical human features a 




Katz, 2019). This discrepancy highlights that physical human-likeness and perceived 
human-likeness are substantively distinct features of a robot: the former is an explicit 
design element and the latter is an emergent element of human-robot interaction. As such, 
physical (objective) humanness should be treated as an independent variable, while 
perceived (subjective) human-likeness can serve as a dependent variable.  
Some have suggested this lack of alignment is due to humans’ need to maintain 
their dominance and hierarchy over other “living” beings (Ferrari et al., 2016). Wang et 
al. (2015) proposed the “dehumanization hypothesis” to explicate the “uncanny valley 
phenomenon”1 (which they distinguish from the uncanny valley hypothesis in order to 
dispense with the need to show a precise mathematical relationship between human 
likeness and eeriness, which others (Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al., 2014) have also 
observed). Because mind perception and anthropomorphism are facilitators of social 
interactions, Wang and colleagues (2015) build on these ideas with the dehumanization 
hypothesis, which asserts that “the more human observers attribute humanlike 
characteristics to (i.e., anthropomorphize) a human replica, the more likely detecting its 
mechanistic features triggers the dehumanization process that would lead to the uncanny 
feeling” (Wang et al., 2015, p. 402). Indeed, Mays, Krongard, and Katz (2019) found that 
the less human-appearing (humanoid) robot had the highest perceived human-likeness 
 
1 Other hypotheses put forth to explicate the uncanny valley (helpfully reviewed by Wang et 
al., 2015): pathogen avoidance (e.g., evolutionary disgust to avoid disease); mortality salience 
(e.g., reminder and fear of death); evolutionary aesthetics (e.g., human preference for facial 
attractiveness); violation of expectation (e.g., robots fail to meet the expectations of behavioral 
capabilities suggested by their human appearance); categorical uncertainty (e.g., ambiguity 
around the boundaries of machine or human); and mind perception (e.g., attribution of human 




over the more-human-appearing (android) robots. 
This distinction between physical humanness and perceived human-likeness 
should be drawn out further, as there appears to be different effects of perceiving physical 
human traits (resulting in an uncanny valley feeling) and perceiving human-likeness, 
which has been found to correlate with positive attitudes towards robots (Katz & Halpern, 
2014). Importantly, when physical humanness (e.g., the robots’ different physical 
instantiations) and perceived human-likeness are considered together, only perceived 
human-likeness has remained a significant attitude predictor (Katz & Halpern, 2014; 
Mays et al., 2019). Given these findings and prior research on the uncanny valley, a 
robot’s likability and perceived human-likeness is expected to have an inverse 
relationship with its physical humanness: 
H1: The less-human-appearing (e.g., humanoid) robot is perceived more 
favorably than the more -human-appearing (e.g., android) robot in terms of (a) 
likability and (b) perceived human-likeness. 
While robot’s rights have yet to be empirically studied, some work has looked at 
empathy towards robots. This may be informative because research on human rights 
attitudes has found that more empathic people are more likely to endorse human rights 
(MacFarland & Matthews, 2005). Contrary to evidence that physical humanness is 
inversely related to perceived human-likeness and liking (Gray & Wegner, 2012 in Wang 
et al., 2015, Mays, Krongard, & Katz, 2019), Riek, Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, and 
Robinson (2009) found that, when mistreating robots, people empathized more with those 




evidence that physical humanness does not have a monolithic effect on all perceptions of 
or reactions to robots. It is, therefore, unclear whether people would be more or less 
likely to attribute rights to robots based on physical humanness:  
RQ1: Does the robot’s physical humanness affect perceptions of its entitlement to 
rights? 
Gender. The presence of gender in technology has traditionally manifested through voice 
and naming. As early as 1966, a rudimentary “computer therapist” program called 
“ELIZA” provided simple, text-only responses to people’s typed disclosures. In some, 
these disclosures elicited feelings of closeness and trust, to the extent that some of those 
who became attached to ELIZA refused to believe that “she” was not a real person 
(Weizenbaum, 1966). Since ELIZA, Siri, Cortana, Alexa, and earlier GPS counterparts 
entered the fray, all female-voiced and assistive. This predominance of female-voiced 
assistants coupled with their explosive growth has raised concerns about how they both 
reflect and may reinforce and spread gender bias (Woods, 2018). Nass, Moon, and Green 
(2006) found that people’s tendency to gender stereotype, even based on a minimal 
gender cue of only voice, remained quite consistent and powerful. Further, qualitative 
(Carpenter et al., 2009) and experimental (Eyssel & Hegel, 2012) research has found that 
stereotypical gender roles and expectations were attributed to robots, supporting van 
Zoonen’s (2002) claim that social norms among humans would extend to emergent 
technologies. Gender stereotypes could therefore influence functionally how a social 
robot is incorporated in everyday life — for example, a female robot may only be used 




gender-based role or task assignment, perception of fit for a role (and subsequent 
perceptions of liking, for example) may be influenced by gender. Further, this application 
of human interaction tendencies such as gender stereotyping indicates a potential blurring 
of the ontological boundary between human and robot.  
As robot technology advances, such that it manifests not only through voice and 
name, but also through physical embodiment, it is important to understand the influence 
of these physical traits on perceptions and attitudes. Evidence has been found for non-
gendered traits to have an influence on perceptions; specifically, research has shown that 
people have preferences for robots with similar traits to them. For example, Edwards and 
colleagues (2019) applied social identity theory to study whether a robot’s age 
(manifested through a voice cue) influenced older and younger participants differently, 
and found, indeed, that older participants rated the older-voiced robot more highly than 
the younger participants. Eyssel and Kuchenbrandt (2012) similarly found in-group and 
out-group biases related to a robot’s projected nationality. There may be a different 
dynamic with gendered traits, however. Research that has examined interactions between 
subjects’ gender and gendered robots have more often identified a cross-gender effect: 
men have tended to prefer a female robot and vice-versa (Nomura, 2017, Siegel, Brezeal, 
& Norton, 2009). In that vein, robot gender may have a significant effect on men’s and 
women’s perceptions of robots. 
It is well-established that men are more open and positively disposed to robots 
than are women (Schermerhorn et al., 2008); however, the robot used in Schermerhorn et 




gendered robot, though this effect was much stronger for a man’s attitude towards a 
female robot (Siegel et al., 2009). Further, in a study using only one gendered robot (e.g., 
a male robot), men liked the robot more than women (Schermerhorn et al., 2008). In a 
study testing media equation with robots, Eyssel and Hegel (2012) found that people 
applied gender stereotypes to robots, assigning them to stereotypically gendered tasks 
(technical work vs. child-rearing) on the basis of the robot’s hair length (short vs. long — 
no other features were different between the robots). The short-haired (male) robot was 
also ascribed more agency, while the long-haired (female) robot was perceived as more 
communal. In this way, gender could be considered both a component of appearance as 
well as one of social context, which will be discussed further in the next section.  
Therefore, it is less clear whether men and women may exhibit the same in-group, 
out-group biases around gender that have been found with regards to nationality (Eyssel 
& Kuchenbrandt, 2012) and age (Edwards et al., 2019). Some studies reviewed above 
(e.g., Nomura, 2017, Siegel et al., 2009) suggest a heterophily preference, but another 
study found men were more open to robots than were women when only male-gendered 
robots were examined (Schermerhorn et al., 2008). Important, too, is to consider whether 
human likeness may moderate these perceptions. Prior research indicates that robot 
gender may influence humanization perceptions. However, this research has produced 
mixed findings and study designs that are restricted to one robot gender; as such, it is 
unclear what the exact nature is between robot and user gender on humanization. 




RQ2a-c: Does the robot’s gender (male vs. female) affect the ways that men and 
women perceive the robot in terms of (a) likability, (b) human-likeness, and (c) 
entitlement to rights? 
RQ3: Are humanoid female- and male-presenting robots perceived differently 
than android female- and male-presenting robots in terms of (a) likability, (b) 
human-likeness, and (c) entitlement to rights? 
There have been conflicting findings about the role that people’s gender plays in 
their acceptance of or comfort with robots (Nomura et al., 2006; de Graaf & Allouch, 
2013). Most have found that women have more negative attitudes towards robots (Arras 
& Cerqui, 2005; de Graaf & Allouch, 2013, Katz, Halpern, & Crocker, 2015), perhaps 
due to men having more experience with robots and greater exposure to technology (Katz 
& Halpern, 2014). Similarly, women are less likely than men to accept robots socially 
and professionally (Katz, Halpern, & Crocker, 2015). Schermerhorn, Scheutz, and 
Crowell (2008) found that men view robots as more human-like than women and were 
more socially facilitated by robots (e.g., responded to a robot’s physical presence more 
similarly to a human’s presence). 
On the other hand, Shibata, Wada, Ikeda, & Sabanovic (2009) found that women 
demonstrated more comfort with social robots. As suggested by de Graaf and Allouch 
(2013), though, this finding may have been due to the fact that the robot in question was a 
zoomorphic baby seal, and according to Turkle (2011), women demonstrate more 
openness to taking care of artificial entities than men (cited in de Graaf and Allouch, 




a more generic social context, rather than within the narrow confines of a caretaking 
scenario. Thus, it is expected that men will have more positive perceptions of robots in 
terms of likability and perceived human-likeness. It is yet unclear whether that trend will 
extend to perceptions of robot rights, and whether the physical human-likeness has any 
moderating influence. One study found that a robot’s gender had no effect on eeriness 
perceptions influenced by its context (e.g., as having experience, agency, or as a tool), 
though the robot’s physical embodiment was not manipulated as well (Appel, 
Izydorczyk, Weber, Mara, & Lischetzke, 2020). Taken together, it is expected that 
participant gender will influence liking and human-likeness perceptions; given the lack of 
extant empirical research on robot rights, a research question is posed about the influence 
of gender of perceptions of rights entitlement: 
H2a: Men, as compared to women, perceive robots as more likable. 
H2b: Men, as compared to women, perceive robots as more human-like.  
RQ4: Do men and women have different perceptions of a robot’s entitlement to 
rights? 
Status: Putting social robots in context  
The relational aspect has been less studied but is an important next step for 
examining social robots. In particular, a robot’s status, and the extent to which it should 
be accorded rights, addresses some of the metaphysical and ontological issues that this 
technology raises (Edwards, 2018). Gunkel (2018c) has suggested that we are at the 
“third wave” of HCI research, which “is concerned not with the capabilities or operations 




with the phenomenon of the relationship that is situated between them” (p. 3). This 
“relational turn” follows what Hoflich (2013) has proposed, in expanding the dyadic 
model of human-robot-interaction into a triadic model that takes into account an 
autonomous social robot as “not only ‘a third’ (thing) but also ‘the third’ (social entity or 
communication partner)” (p. 36) within the larger context of human-human 
communication.  
In a similar vein, Turkle, Taggart, Kidd, and Dasté (2006) have conceptualized 
social robots as “relational artifacts,” which prompt reflection “about aliveness, what is 
special about being a person, and the roles of thought and feeling in human uniqueness” 
(p. 360). There has been a great deal of ontological and philosophical discussion already 
about robots and future human-robot interaction, in terms of whether robots can and 
should be considered agentic, moral beings and accorded rights as any other living being 
(see e.g., Gunkel, 2018a, 2018b, Guzman, 2018a). What Turkle and colleagues (2006) 
pinpoint as critical is the way that human-robot relations may reveal more about a 
person’s life outside of the robot interactions themselves; in this “robot as Rorschach,” 
HRI serves as a point of reflection about one’s own identity and relationships. 
Accordingly, research has shown that people prefer a robot’s appearance to align 
with the type of job or task its assigned: more human-like robots were preferred for 
socially and artistically oriented job while more mechanical robots were preferred for 
more rote and conventional jobs (Goetz, Kiesler, & Powers, 2003). This indicates 
potentially that there are society-wide conceptions of and norms for what the essence of 




Goetz and colleagues (2003) found this pattern to be stronger for female-appearing robots 
than for male-appearing robots, which suggests the possibility that a robot’s gender may 
play a role in people’s perceptions. Katz and Halpern (2014) similarly found that more 
(perceived) human-likeness was related to acceptance of a robot for “social companion” 
oriented occupations. More generally, studies have shown that people tend to have 
domain-specific ideas about where robots would best fit in: service-oriented and 
memorization-reliant jobs (Takayama et al., 2008) and assistant-type roles (Dautenhahn 
et al., 2005).  
Another way to categorize robots’ social roles is hierarchically, through a social 
distance-type spectrum. Social distance has been an important sociological notion in 
human-human relations that can explain intimacy with others, inter-group perceptions, 
and identification (Kim & Mutlu, 2014). Studies on robots have to varying degrees 
measured social distance through other related metrics like physical proximity, self-
disclosure, robot liking, and social presence (Banks and Edwards, 2019). Halpern & Katz 
(2013) adapted the Bogardus’ Social Distance scale that is typically used to assess 
prejudice as a proxy measure of robot acceptance. The various ways these measures have 
been used speak to the differing conceptualizations of social distance (Kim & Mutlu, 
2014); what this research is interested in particularly is the “social structural distance” 
created by different status levels.  
To a degree, the research on robot acceptance in various life-work domains gets at 
the notion of status: implicit in the findings that people are more comfortable with an 




of superiority over robots. Kim and Mutlu (2014) found that physical distance and power 
distance — whether the robot was presented as a subordinate or a supervisor — affected 
how positively someone viewed the robot (preferring the higher-status robot to be close, 
and the lower-status robot to be farther away). Examining status in a work context, 
Hinds, Robert, and Jones (2004) found that overall participants were more critical of a 
supervisory robot when relying on it to complete a task — they gave less credit to the 
supervisor robot and took less responsibility for the task as compared to task completion 
with a peer or subordinate robot (Hinds et al., 2004).  
There is less research on the effect of a robot’s status on social and moral 
perceptions. The findings so far on in-group/out-group biases towards robots (Eyssel & 
Kuchenbrandt, 2012; Edwards et al., 2019) indicate that robots in a superior position 
would be disliked more; similarly, Ferrari et al.’s (2016) threat to human distinctiveness 
hypothesis suggests that superior-status robots might be perceived as less human-like (as 
a protective measure against identity threat) and disliked more than those who are 
positioned as peers or subordinates. An experiment that examined empathic responses to 
robots found that subjects showed less empathy towards more autonomous robots (Kwak, 
Kim, Kim, Shin, & Cho, 2013). While empathy is different from liking, both responses 
are relational in nature, and empathy has been linked to more prosocial attitudes and less 
antisocial behavior (Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 2010). Therefore, the empathy 
findings from Kwak et al. (2013) might suggest that robots holding a status with more 
implicit agency (e.g., supervisor) would be liked less. Agentic robots have also been 





Further, ongoing research about perceptions of an “AI agent” (defined as “smart 
computers that put into action decisions that they make by themselves”) supports the 
notion that hierarchy is an important element (see summary of findings in Chapter 2 and 
Appendix X). While Mays, Lei, and Katz (manuscript in progress) did not present a robot 
explicitly, the description of an “AI agent” conjures similar abilities as a robot (e.g., an 
autonomous and agentic technology). People were asked about their comfort with an “AI 
agent” in a series of different roles that varied in their level of status and power (e.g., as a 
leader of your country, mayor, leader of your company, work manager, work advisor, 
work colleague, personal assistant, therapist). An exploratory factor analysis revealed two 
dimensions to comfort with AI in different roles: AI with power and AI as peer. The 
present study aims to further this descriptive finding by testing how these distinctions of 
status relate to humanization perceptions.  
Their survey also asked questions about an AI agent taking on different roles in 
educational settings, and a similar dynamic was revealed in that people were much more 
accepting of assistive AI (e.g., as a grader, logistics coordinator) than they were with AI 
in educational roles with more agency and power (e.g., as a teacher or career guidance 
counselor). A qualitative analysis of respondents’ open-ended comments about these AI 
questions supported the quantitative findings; namely, that people can see the possibilities 
with and benefits of AI technology, but that the lack of human traitsin AI — such as 
empathy, nuanced and contextual thinking, past human experience — is concerningl 




important for AI taking a larger role in our lives. It seems likely that a similar pattern 
would be found when people are presented with physical instantiations of this 
technology, like a robot. 
The potential influence of people’s traits, as well as the robot’s physical traits 
(e.g., appearance and gender) is not clear from the extant research on robot perceptions. 
Siegel et al. (2009) did find that men were more positively disposed towards female 
robots, but this was in the context of the robot asking for a donation, arguably placing it 
in a more supplicative position. The robot’s gender could in and of itself be considered 
both an aspect of appearance, as described in the prior section, as well as a component of 
context. Social role theory suggests that gendered socialization from a young age may 
influence perceptions: men are viewed as physically stronger and assertive and thus more 
threatening, while women are viewed as more timid, nurturing, and gentle, and thus less 
threatening and more in need of protection (Eagly & Wood, 2016). In this way, gender 
could implicitly suggest certain power dynamics. The extent to which a robot’s physical 
humanness creates notions of human-robot competition (Ferrari et al., Spence, 
Westerman, & Lin, 2020) could also be relevant, especially as an interaction with the 
robot’s status. Given these considerations, the study proposes that: 
H3: A robot holding a higher status will be perceived as less (a) likable (b) 
human-like and (c) entitled to rights. 
Considering the possibility that gender could affect perceptions of status, or that 




RQ6: Is there an interaction between the robot’s gender and status in their effects 
on perceptions of robots as (a) likable (b) human-like and (c) entitled to rights? 
RQ7: Is there an interaction between the robot’s physical human-likeness and 
status in their effects on perceptions of robots as (a) likable (b) human-like and (c) 
entitled to rights? 
Summary 
Robots are a lesser known technology with uncertain but seemingly very powerful 
potential, which for decades has been portrayed in cultural artifacts as threats to human 
primacy. And, when portrayed as friendly and non-threatening, they are mostly placed in 
a supplicative position to humans. Despite the existential threats that media tend to depict 
in human-robot relations, however, people’s relationships to non-robotic technology 
indicates that we will treat robots socially — demonstrated through the media equation 
— and assimilate them into our lives in ways that may disrupt existing norms but still 
fulfill a fundamental human need, as apparatgeist suggests. Social robots are distinct from 
their technological predecessors for which media equation and apparatgeist have 
identified these dynamics: specifically, aided by AI systems, social robots can interact 
autonomously and agentically with humans, and some are embodied to take on physical 
human form and gender.  
Research has demonstrated that, in general, people will resist robots that look too 
much like, and act agentically like, humans. It stands to reason that people would feel 
threatened by robots and other kinds of AI-enabled technology, and this has been shown 




distinctiveness” phenomena. This study’s main contribution is to expand the scope of 
measures that constitute resistance to, acceptance of, comfort with robots. The emerging 
field of HMC calls for interrelated considerations of functionality, sociality, and 
metaphysicality when studying this technology capable of communication and interacting 
with humans. Therefore, this study proposes measures of robot humanization that 
correspond to these considerations: perceived human-likeness, liking, and perceptions of 
rights’ entitlement. It also considers fixed aspects of a social robot’s presentation and 
framing (both physical apperance and contextualization) that can be objectively manifest 
and that may influence humanization perceptions: physical humanness, gender, and their 
status relative to the human. Research has shown that the elements of gender and 
humanness have an influence on perceptions. This study builds on these findings and 
incorporates status as well to explore the extent to which social context and hierarchy 
may affect perceptions of gender and humanness in robots.  
The primary focus of the dissertation will be on the data collected for this study. 
However, its design is informed by a series of studies: specifically, two online surveys 
have been conducted over the last two years to gather insights on people’s perceptions of 
robots and AI. Therefore, the second chapter outlines the main findings from these 
studies to illustrate how they inform the present study’s design and research questions. 
The third chapter describes the main study’s methodology; the fouth chapter presents the 





CHAPTER 2. HUMAN FACTORS IN PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL ROBOTS 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter laid out some of the technological features that might affect 
perceptions and use of social robots, which undergird the rationale for studying the 
humanization of social robots. The development of their unique affordances — 
autonomous participation in communication exchanges in tandem with human-aping 
features, whether voice, facial expressions, verbal cues, and so on — did not spring up 
out of thin air: there are people working to create technologies that come ever closer to 
approximating human capabilities. Apparatgeist would suggest that these design efforts 
indicate a human desire to co-exist with our technological facsimiles; however, social 
robots’ creators are not necessarily aligned with the general public. Indeed, opinion 
surveys have indicated a general resistance towards robots being normalized in care work 
and social lives (Taipale & Fortunati, 2018). Chapter 1 introduced variation within the 
technology itself that might affect people’s attitudes towards it. Exclusively considering 
the technological features’ impact, however, might imply a deterministic stance that is 
antithetical to this study’s theoretical framework as outlined in Chapter 1. This chapter 
presents evidence that individual variation should also be considered in attitudes towards 
social robots.  
While the objective features of a robot are fixed, like its physicality and context, 
people may differ in their perceptions of its “humanness” based on personal traits and 
past experiences (Peiterson, Teerling, & Ebbers, 2008). Individual differences can be 




that the most significant emergent technology of the last few decades, the Internet, was 
not a monolithic force in everyone’s lives; different people with varying personality traits 
and dispositions use social media differently, for example (Correa et al., 2010).  
Of particular interest here are individual differences related to both lived 
experience and more inherent traits related to efficacy beliefs and social interaction. 
Feelings of apprehension or dislike towards technology may come from an innate human 
desire to control one’s surroundings as well as human necessity to interact with others 
(and technological devices) perceived as equal to or more competent than oneself 
(Sundar, 2020). In addition, people want to look proficient and capable in front of their 
peers and don’t want to risk embarrassment by lacking competence in new technologies 
(Campbell, 2006). In this second aspect, robots would be no different from their 
technological predecessors that were met with the same user resistance. Thus, this study 
considers individual efficacy-related traits that have been shown to influence attitudes 
towards technology: innovativeness, locus of control, and perceived technology 
competence. However, robots are a departure from existing technology on a few key 
aspects: autonomy, agency, and embodiment; in turn, this study also considers 
personality traits related to social interaction, such as extraversion and neuroticism. 
Given the unique features of the technology it also includes domain-specific variables to 
account for one’s prior experience with robots through both real-life exposure as well as 
mediated exposure. 
The goals for this chapter are twofold. The first is to review the literature on how 




second is to present original research on AI and social robots that provide support for 
including individual traits in the current study’s analysis and also helped inform its 
experimental manipulation. The two surveys that comprise the prior research were 
conducted before the present study’s conceptualization, and indeed were crucial to its 
formulation. They include a quasi-experimental design similar to the one employed for 
this study, in which participants were presented with a robot stimulus and asked for their 
perceptions. One survey also measured attitudes about AI technology. While AI is 
distinct from robots, the two technologies share unique affordances — autonomy and 
agency — that disrupt the notion of technology as a tool we can directly control. Further, 
the AI analysis unearthed this idea of the technology’s status as a critical factor in 
people’s attitudes. In service of transparency and thoroughness, it seems prudent to share 
this line of research that is ongoing and, in conjunction with the literature, has informed 
the decisions made for the current study. As such, the chapter will first review the 
literature on the relationships between individual traits and attitudes toward technology 
and then summarize findings from the two recent surveys that looked directly at these 
traits and perceptions of robot and AI technology. After reviewing the surveys’ findings, 
the results’ implications will be considered in relation to the humanization-related 
variables (liking, perceived-human likeness, and rights entitlement) and the present 
study’s design.  
Literature review 
Robot Experience 




attitudes (Rosen, Sears, & Weil, 1993; Katz, Aspden, & Reich, 1997) and reduces their 
anxiety about using them (Orr, Allen, & Poindexter, 2001). The technology acceptance 
model (TAM) theorizes that perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness of a 
technology predict one’s intention to use it. Prior computer experience has been found to 
mediate teachers’ technology acceptance (Teo & Noyes, 2014). When examining what 
might inform one’s perceptions of usefulness and easy use, experience with a technology 
has been found to inform both, in particular perceived ease of use (Lucas & Spitler, 1999, 
Saade & Kira, 2007). In addition to reducing anxiety, experience with a technology can 
increase the perceived enjoyment using it (Kim, Choi, & Han, 2009). Further, perceived 
ease of use and usefulness were more relevant predictors among experienced users of a 
technology, rather than inexperienced users: lack of experience reduces the extent to 
which one might feel confident or able to judge usefulness, and feel enough self-efficacy 
to imagine it as easy to use (Martinez-Torres, Diaz-Fernandez, Toral, Barrero, 2015). 
This suggests that prior experience with a technology is an important antecedent to 
control for. 
In terms of robot perceptions specifically, experience with robots has been shown 
to reduce uncertainty and anxiety towards them (Nomura, Suzuki, Kanda, & Kato, 2006). 
Media exposure may also cultivate certain attitudes towards (Sundar, Waddell, & Jung, 
2016) or mental models (Banks, 2020) of robots. Specifically, when respondents recalled 
more robots from films, they had less anxiety about robots generally, and greater 
sympathy felt towards the recalled robot characters was related to more positive attitudes 




that while recall volume was not a significant factor, sympathy towards recalled robot 
characters predicted positive evaluations of robots generally. Conversely, when people 
had cultivated negative perceptions of robots from media exposure they subsequently 
held more negative attitudes (Horstmann & Kramer, 2019). Further, when robots have 
been framed narratively, they were perceived as more useful (Mara et al., 2013) and less 
uncanny (Mara & Appel, 2015). Thus, the extent to which people have real-life and 
mediated experiences with robots can influence their attitudes.  
Efficacy Traits 
Perceived technology competence 
The extent to which someone perceives themselves as technologically competent 
may follow from their exposure to and experiences with technology, but is important to 
consider separately as it relates more to self-efficacy beliefs that could be particularly 
important when confronted with a new technology. Higher levels of “technical affinity” 
have been correlated with lower robot anxiety (Horstmann & Kramer, 2019). 
Interestingly, people who perceived themselves as having more technological 
competence also showed higher “cybersdystopia.” Being more technologically competent 
could increase one’s awareness of a technology’s potential shortcomings, which might 
explain the increased wariness of robots’ society-wide effects (Katz & Halpern, 2014).  
Innovativeness 
Innovativeness was originally conceptualized as a personality trait that indicated 
one’s willingness to change (Hurt, Joseph, & Cook, 1977). It has since been identified as 




Fiedler, & Park, 2006). Rogers included individual innovativeness in his model for 
diffusion of innovations, and created an “innovator” category of adopters who outpace 
the rest in terms of openness to new things (Rogers, 2003). The research on how 
individual innovativeness relates to technological acceptance and adoption is mixed, 
however. Individual innovativeness has been found to be a significant predictor of 
intended technological use (Yi et al., 2006), and more innovative teachers, for example, 
were more likely to use computers in their classroom (van Braak, 2001). In a different 
study, though, domain-specific innovativeness was more likely to predict product 
adoption as compared to innate innovativeness, which appeared to have no effect (Chao, 
Reid, & Mavondo, 2012). Looking at more sustained use, beyond initial adoption, 
innovativeness may not have as much of an influence (Doong, Wang, & Foxall, 2010).  
Locus of control 
One’s amount of innovativeness may be predicated in part on how confident they 
are in their ability to harness the new technology. The notion of control has been 
incorporated in a number of theories related to intention and behavior, including Theory 
of Planned Behavior and the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Venkatesh, 2000). 
The locus of control scale (Rotter, 1966) was developed in the mid-1950s to measure the 
extent to which people felt that they could control their outcomes (Lida & Chaparro, 
2002). Rotter (1966) found differences in participants’ behavior when they perceived 
outcomes as contingent on their own behavior (internal locus of control) compared to 
those who thought outcomes were contingent on outside factors like chance (external 




their own behavior and actions affect the outcomes in their life; conversely, the more 
someone feels like other people and events influence what happens to them, the higher 
their external locus of control (Rotter, 1966). 
This is, arguably, a fundamental worldview that underlies a wide range of 
everyday experiences, decisions, and preferences. With regards to technology use, locus 
of control has been found to predict more goal-oriented online activity and be related to 
earlier computer adoption and usage practices (Lida & Chaparro, 2002). Research has 
consistently shown it to be a predictor of users’ perceptions of new technologies. As 
mentioned above, to some extent, locus of control has been subsumed under other 
variables like perceived ease of use in the TAM and perceived behavioral control in the 
theory of planned behavior, both of which get at perceptions of efficacy with regards to 
the particular technology or behavior modification (Venkatesh, 2000). As an antecedent, 
it is a reliable predictor of how technology is perceived in terms of ease of use and 
usefulness, the cornerstones of TAM (Venkatesh, 2000; Tseng & Hsia, 2008; Hsia, 
Cheng, & Tseng, 2012; Hsia, 2016; Jang, Shin, Aum, Kim, & Kim, J, 2016). It has also 
been found to be a strong predictor of technology adoption in global contexts (Abu-
Shanab, 2011; Abay, Blalock, Berhane, 2017; Taffesse & Tadesse, 2017). This may be in 
part because locus of control shapes risk perception and people with high internal locus 
of control are “more likely to accept the risk in using new technology” (Fong, Lam, & 
Law, 2017).  
However, findings are mixed in terms of the extent to which locus of control 




corresponded with more positive perceptions of computers (Coovert & Goldstein, 1980) 
and that locus of control was not related to computer anxiety; rather, variables like 
exposure and cognitive appraisal informed attitudes towards the technology (Crable, 
Brodzinski, Scherer, & Jones, 1994). To that end, in the context of mobile app reuse, 
locus of control was mediated by effort expectancy (Fong et al., 2017), suggesting that 
including both a specific technology competence variable (e.g., less effort is expected 
with more perceived competence) and locus of control variable is important (Broos & 
Roe, 2006; Reinicke, & Marakas, 2005). 
Personality Traits 
Extraversion and neuroticism 
With an interactive technology like robots, particularly, social personality traits 
are important. To that end, extraversion/introversion - the extent to which someone 
enjoys and seeks out social interaction or enjoys being alone - is the most commonly 
studied personality trait with regards to social robots (Robert, 2018). People who are 
more extraverted tend to humanize robots more, and are also more comfortable with them 
(Salem, Lakatos, Amirabdollahian, & Dautenhahn, 2015, in Robert, 2018). At least 
among older people, higher extraversion was related to more openness toward social 
robots (Damholdt et al., 2015). In that same vein, neuroticism (ie, less emotional 
stability) was related to less comfort with robots and a lower propensity to humanize 
them (Robert, 2018). Research has also examined the influence of personality traits 
manifested by robots, and shows that people tend to prefer extraverted, friendly robots 




(Joosse, Lohse, Pérez, & Evers, 2013; Robert, 2018).  
Influence of personal traits on robot and AI attitudes: Review of two studies’ 
findings 
Method Summary 
As indicated in the first chapter, this dissertation’s study is informed by two 
surveys conducted in the last two years that examined the relationships between 
individuals’ traits, technological features, and perceptions of the technology. Both were 
administered through the professional survey company Qualtrics and identified nationally 
representative quotas for gender, age, race, education, and income. An elaboration on the 
Methods and findings from the quantitative analysis can be found in Appendix A. These 
findings have been reported in conference presentations but have not yet been published 
in journal articles or book chapters. What follows is a summary of the major findings of 
these surveys, as well as consideration of how their results can inform the current 
experimental investigation into factors influencing robot humanization. 
Summary of Findings and Implications 
The surveys measured perceptions of robots and AI. For questions about robot 
perceptions (both general and social attitudes), participants were either shown one image 
of three different robots: a more mechanical-appearing (e.g., humanoid) non-gendered 
robot, a more human-appearing (e.g., android) female, or android male robot or provided 
a written description of a male or female autonomous robot. Perceptions of AI were 
gauged by providing participants with a definition of an “AI agent” as a “smart computer 




comfortable they would be with such a technology in various societal roles, ranging from 
very powerful (e.g., country leader) to least powerful (e.g., personal assistant).  
While AI and robots are not one in the same, social robots’ capabilities for 
interaction and autonomy are driven by AI technology. Further, the survey measuring AI 
perceptions defined the technology as an “AI agent,” which suggests a standalone entity 
that has autonomy. Thus, findings about both types of technology informed the present 
study’s exploration. Briefly, perceptions of robots differed across conditions: the 
humanoid agender robot was preferred most, though not significantly more than the 
female android, while the male android was preferred significantly less than the female 
and agender robots (see Appendix A). The written descriptions of robots did not elicit the 
same significant differences, suggesting perhaps that visual stimuli provoked stronger 
reactions. Alternatively, the robots pictured may have appeared more or less inherently 
threatening, and the differences observed are not externally generalizable. (This potential 
confound informed the rigorous pre-testing conducted on the visual stimuli used in the 
current study, described in the next chapter.) 
Nevertheless, the differences discovered across robots suggested that appearance 
(both gender and physical humanness) may influence perceptions. Specifically, the 
humanoid agender robot was liked most and perceived as the most human-like compared 
to the more human-appearing robots, providing evidence for the uncanny valley effect 
reviewed in chapter 1. The male android robot was liked the least and perceived as the 
least human-like compared to both the female android and humanoid robot. The present 




android and humanoid robots.  
Study 2 investigated people’s comfort with AI, isolating the influence of agency 
as an aspect of these technologies (e.g., AI and social robots) from embodiment. 
Exploring AI perceptions revealed that context likely matters, particularly with regard to 
power distance. The scale for comfort with AI in various roles was multidimensional, 
showing a clear construct for “AI in power” and “AI as peer” (see Appendix A). As 
discussed further below, this finding suggested that status might be an important 
consideration in tandem with the characteristics of social robots’ physical appearance.  
Again, the primary aim of this chapter was to introduce the individual factors that 
might affect perceptions of emerging technology like social robots. Evidence for this 
influence can be found both in the extant literature as well as the two prior studies that 
were foundational to the present study’s design. Specifically, personality traits related to 
socialization, such as extraversion and neuroticism, had some influence on general 
negative and social perceptions of robots: higher levels of extraversion and neuroticism 
were related to more cyberdystopia and robot phobia, as well as more imagined relational 
closeness. Extraverts were also more comfortable with AI in general — positively 
predicting comfort with both an AI in power and an AI peer, while neuroticism 
negatively predicted comfort with an AI in power. 
Locus of control emerged as an important factor in perceptions, particularly when 
it comes to relational and power dynamics: a higher internal locus of control was 
negatively related to imagined relational closeness across both studies and also predicted 




model. Other efficacy-related traits such as perceived technology competence and 
communication apprehension informed perceptions as well. Those who perceived 
themselves as more technologically competent were less robot phobic, liked robots more, 
had higher imagined relational closeness, and were more comfortable with both AI 
constructs. Interpersonal communication apprehension was positively related to comfort 
with as AI in power and an AI as peer; interestingly, more public speaking apprehension 
was only a significant predictor for an AI in power: those with more apprehension were 
less comfortable with “AI power.” Additionally, robot phobia negatively predicted AI 
comfort, indicating that pre-existing perceptions of the technology have an influence; as 
such, the present study more comprehensively accounts for prior experience with and 
preconceived notions of robots. Finally, gender and age were important demographic 
predictors for most of the dependent variables across both studies. 
Put together, the findings from both studies indicate that individual traits 
influence perceptions. The personality traits showed differing effects across different 
dependent variables —extraversion was related to more positive social attitudes about 
robots and more comfort with AI, but also more general negative attitudes (e.g., 
cyberdystopia, phobia) towards robots. Neuroticism only contributed to less comfort with 
an AI in power and was not related to comfort with an AI as peer, suggesting that status 
may influence the extent to which neuroticism influences certain perceptions. This 
finding about status was also prevalent with one of the efficacy-related traits, locus of 
control. While one’s locus of control was a significant predictor of comfort with both 




with a higher internal locus of control was much less comfortable with an AI in power. 
Interestingly, the technology-specific efficacy, perceived technology competence, 
showed different effects than locus of control: the more one perceived themselves as 
technologically competent, the more open they were towards robots and comfortable they 
were with AI. Considering these findings and the literature reviewed, the current study 
asks the following: 
RQ8a-c: To what extent are perceptions of a robots’ human-likeness, liking, and 
rights’ entitlement influenced by a) robot experience; b) efficacy traits; and c) 
personality traits? 
As mentioned above, the studies also informed the choices for the experimental 
manipulation. The manipulation of robot gender and physical humanness in study 1 
indicated that both factors may influence perceptions. In that study, however, the 
humanoid robot’s gender was not manipulated (there was only a single humanoid 
“agender” robot). Thus, it was difficult to tease out the separate and different effects 
gender and physical humanness had on perceptions.  
Importantly, the studies revealed that robot traits, both those physically presented 
and perceived human-likeness, was a strong predictor of social, but not general, attitudes 
towards robots. While robot type and perceived human-likeness only explained little of 
the variance in cyberdystopic and robot-phobic perceptions, they explained a little under 
and a little over 50% of the variance in liking and imagined relational closeness, 
respectively (see Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A). These findings suggested that 




them as social entities, which is why it is included in the present study as a main 
dependent variable.  
Additionally, the decision to manipulate the robot’s status in the present study 
derives from study 2’s finding that comfort with AI was comprised of two distinct 
constructs of power and peer, suggesting that the technology in relation to the respondent 
may be a critical determinant of perceptions. It is intuitive that people would be less 
comfortable with technology in a position of power — people also don’t enjoy much 
when other humans hold power over them — but how is this discomfort manifested and 
modified in tandem with other considerations, on both the technological and individual 
sides? 
The goal for studying both the robot’s physical traits as well as the contextual 
components is to provide a fuller picture of what dynamics might be at play with an 
embodied social robot in people’s everyday lives. The first chapter reviewed the 
technological features that may influence humanizing perceptions of social robots, and 
this chapter reviewed the user’s traits that may also moderate and inform these 
perceptions. Personality and efficacy-related traits are both included in order to account 
for the social and agentic nature of the robots presented to subjects. Further, content-
specific variables that cover one’s pre-existing experience with and exposure to robots is 
considered more precisely than in the prior studies reported above. In expanding one the 
prior studies’ findings, the current study specifically seeks to isolate and elucidate how 
individual traits and prior experience contribute to perceptions of social robots that vary 




jointly considering robot variables and relevant user differences, the present study may be 
best positioned to offer insight into forthcoming differences or divides in the adoption of 
social robots. The next chapter describes in more detail how the social robots presented to 
subjects in the current study were selected and manipulated to incorporate the variations 
in physical humanness, gender, and status, as well as how the individual difference 




CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
 
Design and Participants 
This study is a 2 (gender) x 2 (physical humanness) x 3 (status) between-subjects 
online experiment. Through the professional survey company Qualtrics, a questionnaire 
containing the manipulated stimuli and self-report measures was administered. Quotas 
were established for age and gender to ensure an equal distribution of these 
characteristics across the 12 conditions; otherwise, participants (N = 1,020) were 
randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions. Each condition included an image of a robot 
that varied on its physical humanness — humanoid (more mechanical appearing) versus 
android (more human appearing) — and its gender (female vs. male). The image was 
shown alongside a scenario that described the robot’s status relative to the subject, as a 
subordinate, peer, or superior. Participants were presented with the robot image and 
description, then asked to imagine this scenario when answering the dependent measures 
of how much they perceived the robot as human-like, likable, and deserving of rights. 
After viewing the stimuli and responding to the main dependent measures, participants 
were asked a series of questions to measure the personality and experience traits that 
serve as controls in the study. 
Pre-testing Robot Images 
Robots come in all shapes and sizes, and even those that are embodied as human 
range widely in their appearance. To select the robot images to be used in this study, a 




robots that were: significantly similar to one another in their physical humanness but 
significantly different from one another in their gender; between pairs, physical 
humanness should be significantly different. Further, all four robots should be similar to 
one another in terms of perceived threat in order to control for instrinsic differences in 
appearance that would influence humanizing perceptions beyond the manipulated 
independent variables of physical humanness, gender, and status. In terms of the 
manipulated variables, specifically, the male and female humanoids should be statisically 
different in gender perception but similar (e.g., not statistically significantly different) in 
physical humanness, and the same results should appear within the android pair. Both 
robots in the android pair should be statistically significantly different from both robots in 
the humanoid pair of the measure of physical humanness perceptions.  
In the pre-test, 21 robot images were included (see Appendix B). These robot 
images were initially identified from two different sources: the ABOT (Anthropomorphic 
roBOT) database and Stanford’s Social Robots Database. ABOT was developed by 
researchers at Brown University for the Humanity Centered Robotics Initiative, led by 
Bertram Malle. It contains 251 robots and provides their names, overall human-likeness 
scores, and the researcher, institute, or company that developed the robot. The overall 
human-likeness score was manually derived by laypeople. Specifically, workers on 
Amazon’s online crowdsourcing platform Mechnical Turk (MTurk) were asked to score 
each robot on the presence of 18 features: arm, hand, finger, torso, leg, eyelashes, head, 
hair, skin, gender, nose, eyebrow, apparel, face, eyes, mouth, wheels, and treads/tracks 




broader dimensions of human features — body manipulators (torso, legs, arms, hands, 
fingers), surface look (gender, head hair, skin, nose, eyebrow, eyelashes, apparel), facial 
features (head, face, eyes, mouth), and mechanical locomotion (wheels, treads). Put 
together, these scores comprise an overall “human-likeness score, which can then be used 
as a filter to select for a subset of robots (Phillips, Zhao, Ullman, & Malle, 2018). 
For this study, human-likeness ranges of 40 – 69 and 70 – 100 were applied to 
filter robots that appeared less and more human-like. Robots in the ABOT database range 
on human-likeness from 1.44 – 96.95. The human-likeness threshold of 40 was applied in 
order to retrieve robots that were similar enough in human appearance such that gender 
could also be discerned. The robots retrieved from these filters were then cross-
referenced against Stanford’s database, in order to ensure that the ABOT database had 
not missed any suitable robots. However, the Stanford database did not yield any 
additional robots for the pre-test.   
The pre-test instrument measured three variables regarding the physical apperance 
of the 21 robots: appearance of physical humanness, appearance of gender, and 
perceptions of threateningness. Using 9-point semantic differential items adapted from 
MacDorman (2006), Bartneck, Kulić, Croft, and Zoghbi (2009), and Ho and MacDorman 
(2010), respondents (N = 71) were asked to describe the robot’s physical appearance. 
Four items measured users’ evaluatons of physical humanness: machine-like vs. human-
like; artificial vs. natural; robotic vs. human; human-made vs. human-like. Gender 
perceptions were measured by two items: male vs. female; masculine vs. feminine. 




cold vs. warm; threatening vs. friendly; unlikeable vs. likeable; dangerous vs. safe.  
In order to select a smaller subset of robots to statistically test for significant and 
non-significant differences, the mean scores for gender were looked at first, and robots 
with scores on either end of the scale (lower score = more male appearing; higher score = 
more female appearing) were selected. After winnowing the robots on the basis of 
gender, a few additional robots were removed due to having more extreme 
threateningness scores. Ultimately, eight robots (one female humanoid, two male 
humanoid, three female android, and two make android, see Appendix B for the images) 
were identified for further analysis based on their gender and perceived threat scores: 
Romeo (male humanoid), Roboray (male humanoid), Mahru (male android), Geminoid 
(male android), Ira (female humanoid), Gazeroid (female android), Kodomoroid (female 
android), and Nadine (female android). The corresponding measures of male appearance 
(α = .70) female appearance (α = .71), humanoid appearance (α = .85), android 
appearance (α = .90) and threateningness (α = .81) reached acceptables levels of 
reliability for this subset. 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, the humanoid and android robots significantly 
differed from one another in terms of perceived physical humanness. The humanoids 
were similar to one another on physical humanness. For the most part, the androids were 
also similar to one another, with the exception of Mahru (male android) and Nadine 








Table 3.1. Physical humanness scores and comparison of means through paired-samples t-test  
 




 Romeo Roboray Mahru Geminoid Ira Gazeroid Kodomoroid Nadine 
Romeo 2.26 n/a -11.06*** -12.30*** .58 -12.40*** -12.53*** -13.38*** 
Roboray  2.18 -11.17*** -14.37*** .88 -12.63*** -13.48*** -13.82*** 
Mahru   5.98 n/a -10.19*** -.75 -.79 -2.38* 
Geminoid    6.39 -11.44*** 1.85 1.29 -.64 
Ira     2.31 -11.85*** -12.57*** -12.79*** 
Gazeroid      5.97 n/a n/a 
Kodomoroid       6.13 n/a 
Nadine        6.49 
Notes: N = 71, listwise deletion; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. The bolded cells in a diagonal through the table are the Means of each 
robot’s physical humanness score; the paired-samples t-test statistics are in the non-bolded cells. 
 
Table 3.2. Gender scores and comparison of means through paired-samples t-test  
 




 Romeo Roboray Mahru Geminoid Ira Gazeroid Kodomoroid Nadine 
Romeo 3.39        
Roboray n/a 3.84       
Mahru n/a n/a 2.26      
Geminoid n/a n/a n/a 1.97     
Ira 7.16*** 7.52*** 12.74*** 13.24*** 6.08    
Gazeroid 14.70*** 15.72*** 17.80*** 19.21*** n/a 8.12   
Kodomoroid 11.84*** 17.42*** 16.46*** 15.86*** n/a n/a 7.69  
Nadine 15.17*** 17.42*** 20.06*** 19.93*** n/a n/a n/a 8.17 
Notes: N = 71, listwise deletion; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. The bolded cells in a diagonal through the table are the Means of each 





The comparison in gender scores can be seen in Table 3.2, which shows that male 
humanoid and android robots scored significantly differently from the female humanoid 
and android robots. Finally, the comparison of perceived threat scores (see Table 3.3) 
showed that most of the robots were rated similarly, with a few exceptions: Gazeroid was 
perceived as significantly more threatening than Roboray (t = 2.89, p < .01), Geminoid (t 
= 3.04, p < .01), and Mahru (t = 1.86, p < .10).  
 
 
Table 3.3. Perceived threat scores and comparison of means through paired samples t-test 
 




 Romeo Roboray Mahru Geminoid Ira Gazeroid Kodomoroid Nadine 
Romeo 5.48 n/a -.15 -.63 .09 1.65 -.54 -.92 
Roboray  5.88 1.42 .38 1.33 2.89** .68 .07 
Mahru   5.52 n/a -.12 1.86Ϯ -.59 -1.38 
Geminoid    5.75 -.74 3.04** .00 .35 
Ira     5.46 1.87 Ϯ n/a n/a 
Gazeroid      5.03 n/a n/a 
Kodomoroid       5.73 n/a 
Nadine        5.82 
Notes: N = 71, listwise deletion; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. The bolded cells in a diagonal 
through the table are the Means of each robot’s threateningness score; the paired-samples t-test 
statistics are in the non-bolded cells. 
 
Ira (figure 3.1) was already the only female humanoid significantly different from 
both the male humanoid options and female android options. Ultimately, Romeo (figure 
3.2) was selected for the male humanoid condition because of its more masculine gender 
score (3.39 vs. Roboray’s 3.84). Between the two sufficient options for male android 
(Mahru and Geminoid) and remaining options for female android (Kodomoroid and 
Nadine), Nadine (figure 3.3) and Geminoid (figure 3.4) were selected because of their 
similarity in appearance: as both resemble relatively middel-aged white humans, their 




Figure 3.1. Female humanoid robot, “Ira” 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Male humanoid robot, 
“Romeo” 
 









Final Survey Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of both a robot image — one of the four identified above — 
and an accompanying written scenario added next to the image that described the robot’s 
position in relation to the subject in order to implement the third robot trait, status. The 
scenarios were adapted from Złotowski, Yogeeswaran, & Bartneck (2017) and written to 
provide both a description of the social robot and its relative status to the participants as a 
work supervisor (superior status), a co-worker (peer status), or a personal assistant 
(subordinate status). The first block of stimuli showed a full description of the robot and 
its status: 
Superior status description: 
 
Today’s robots can already move on their own and perform a variety of tasks like 
lifting heavy things, cleaning, driving, tutoring, and looking after the elderly. 
They can also solve puzzles and make decisions on their own. 
 
In light of these advances, in the very near future robots might be part of everyday 
life. One setting where robots may be deployed is in the workplace. 
 
Imagine that this robot has been assigned as your supervisor at work. In such a 
role, [she / he] would [assign you tasks and projects, as well as evaluate your 
performance. 
 
Peer status description: 
 
Today’s robots can already move on their own and perform a variety of tasks like 
lifting heavy things, cleaning, driving, tutoring, and looking after the elderly. 
They can also solve puzzles and make decisions on their own. 
 
In light of these advances, in the very near future robots might be part of everyday 
life. One setting where robots may be deployed is in the workplace. 
 
Imagine that this robot has been assigned as your co-worker at work. In such a 
role, [she / he] would be assigned similar tasks to yours, as well as work with you 




Subordinate status description: 
 
Today’s robots can already move on their own and perform a variety of tasks like 
lifting heavy things, cleaning, driving, tutoring, and looking after the elderly. 
They can also solve puzzles and make decisions on their own. 
 
In light of these advances, in the very near future robots might be part of everyday 
life. One setting where robots may be deployed is in the workplace. 
 
Imagine that this robot has been assigned as your personal assistant at work. In 
such a role, [she / he] would help you with your tasks and projects, performing 
duties like answering phones and e-mails, scheduling meetings, and taking care of 
other logistics. 
 
The first stimuli block contained one of the full scenario descriptions above, 
followed by a series of self-report items, which spanned several pages of the experiment 
questionnaire. In order to reduce the cognitive demands in implementating the 
experimental condition across all pages of the questionnaire, subsequent questionnaire 
pages only included the last paragraph of the description (“Imagine that...”). The phrases 
“in the workplace” and “supervisor / co-worker / personal assistant at work” were bolded 
to both call attention to the status but obscure the intended manipulation (e.g., status 
versus working with robots). The robots were referred to with gendered pronouns 
(he/she) in order to cue the intended gender manipulation. While the pre-test on the robot 
images suggested that gender was successfully conveyed visually (see above), the 
pronouns further amplify the robots’ gender.  
In sum, there were three main stimulus blocks per condition within the 
questionnaire. The first contained the robot image accompanied by the full description 
(definition of a social robot and the status position) and the last two consisted of the robot 
image with the abbreviated description with only the status position. All stimuli for each 
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condition can be seen in Appendix C.  
Measures 
As mentioned above, the main dependent measures are perceptions of robot-
human-likeness, robot liking, and perceptions of robot rights. Participants were also 
asked a series of personality (extraversion, neuroticism, innovativeness), efficacy 
(perceived technology competence and locus of control), and experience (prior robot 
exposure, mediated exposure) measures. See Appendix D for all measures and their scale 
items.  
Dependent Variables 
Perceived robot-human likeness 
“Robot-Human Likeness” (7 items, α = .87) measured the extent to which 
participants perceived human qualities in the robot, and is thus a subjective measure of 
human likeness. Adapted from Katz and Halpern’s (2014) scale, the measure included 
statements such as “Most robots are capable of understanding what humans say”, "Robots 
have their own personalities”, “Robots can have feelings”, and “Robots are able to 
recognize human emotions” (M = 4.30, SD = 1.29). Higher values corresponded to higher 
perceptions of human-likeness. 
Robot liking 
The “Robot Liking” measure (7 items, α = .92) was related to a robot helper or 
companionship dynamic, with questions like “if robots had emotions, I would be able to 
make friends with them,” “Robots can contribute to my personal happiness,” I would like 
robots to hand my physically laborious tasks for me,” and “I would feel relaxed talking to 
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robots” (M = 4.54, SD = 1.40). Higher values corresponded to more robot liking.  
Robot rights 
As of the time of this dissertation, there exists no established scale for measuring 
beliefs about the rights owed to social robots or other similar synthetic entities. Ashrafian 
(2015) synthesized existing human rights’ enumerations, such as the Law of Roman 
Empire, InterAction Council’s Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities and 
UNESCO’s Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities, to put forth an argument 
for attending “to the moral responsibilities and duties of artificial intelligence and robots” 
(Asrafian, 2015, p. 326); however, no associated scale was created from this synthesis. 
As such, the items for the scale used in the current study were derived from the United 
Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR consists of 30 articles; of 
these, 19 were modified to pertain to robots. These 19 items encompassed the enumerated 
rights and responsibilities outlined by Ashrafian (2015) and included civil rights such as 
free speech, being able to marry, adopt children, become citizens, vote, and serve on 
juries, as well as moral obligations and autonomy, such as whether a robot should be able 
to report on its owner’s activities, report law-breaking, kill people in certain (e.g., 
threatening) contexts, sue their owners for mistreatment, receive a fair and public 
hearing. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted (see Appendix E), and seven items 
emerged as a a clear measure of enumerated rights: “ Human rights should be extended 
to robots,” “Robots and people should be allowed to marry,” “Robots should be allowed 
to say whatever they want,” “Robots should be allowed to vote,” “Robots should be 
allowed to become citizens of a country,” and “Robots should be allowed to serve on 
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juries.” Higher values corresponded to the perception that robots were more entitled to 
rights (α = .94, M = 2.73, SD = 1.60). There was not a corresponding dimension of moral 
rights and responsibilities that clearly emerged from the factor analysis, indicating that 
aspect of the scale requires further elaboration and validation. Therefore, while this study 
does not argue that the current measure captures all dimensions of “perceived robots 
rights,” the “enumerated rights” dimension appears to be an important dimension to the 
concept that will be studied further here.  
Individual Traits 
Robot Experience 
Real-life exposure. In order to capture different aspects of people’s exposure to robots, 
both real-life experience and cultural exposure were measured. To measure participants’ 
exposure to robots in real life, Hortmann and Kramer’s (2019) “contact with real robots” 
scale, was adapted. This scale asked participants how often (6-point scale, never to very 
often) they had come into contact with a(n): (1) industrial robot, (2) domestic robot like a 
vacuum cleaner or lawnmower, and (3) social robot that is autonomous and can interact 
and communicate with humans. These three measures were combined and averaged to 
create one variable of “robot exposure” (α = .82, M = 2.70, SD = 1.45).  
Mediated exposure. Mediated robot exposure was captured through measures adapted 
from Hortmann and Kramer (2019). The first assessed the amount of exposure: two 
questions asked how frequently (6-point scales, never to very often) participants had seen 
robots in: (1) the news and (2) TV shows or movies (α = .83, M = 3.44, SD = 1.43). 
Participants who did not respond “never” to how often they saw robots in TV shows or 
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movies were then asked about cultural perceptions through a series of items about how 
they would “generally describe the relationship between humans and robots in those 
movies or TV shows” on a 7-point strongly agree — strongly disagree scale: “Robots are 
rather against humans,” “Robots help humans,” “Robots and humans work together,” 
“Robots are a danger to humans,” and “Robots are a threat to the human race” (α = .75, M 
= 3.40, SD = 1.03).  
Efficacy 
Locus of control. Rotter’s (1966) 13-item locus of control scale was adapted and reduced 
to five items (α = .84), again measuring on a seven-point, Likert-type scale (“strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree”). Higher values corresponded to a higher external locus of 
control, with statements such as “When I make plans, I am almost certain I can make 
them work” (reverse-coded) and “I do not have enough control over the direction my life 
is taking” (M = 3.53, SD = 1.17). 
Innovativeness. The measure for innovativeness was adapted from Hurt and colleagues 
(1977). It is a seven-point (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) 7-item Likert-type 
scale (α = .70) that included statements such as: “I enjoy trying new ideas” and “I often 
find myself skeptical of new ideas” (reverse-coded). Items were coded such that a higher 
score indicated higher innovativeness (M = 4.47, SD = .94). 
Perceived technology competence. A measure of people’s perceived competence with 
communication technologies (PTC) was used in order to gauge self-efficacy with 
technology generally and in addition to specific experience with the technology in 
question (robots). Adapted from Katz and Halpern (2014), the 7-item scale (α = .90) 
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asked about how much people enjoy and feel comfortable using technology, and included 
items like “I enjoy using my mobile phone to communicate with people,” “I feel 
technology in general is easy to operate,” “It is easy for me to use my computer to 
communicate with others,” and “Other people come to me for advice on new 
technologies” (M = 5.36, SD = 1.22). A higher score indicated a higher perceived 
technology competence.  
Personality 
Extraversion. The scale for extraversion was adapted from Eysenck, Eysenck, and 
Barrett’s (1985) original 12-item measure and shortened to nine items. It was measured 
on a seven-point, Likert-type scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and 
asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed with statements like “I 
enjoy meeting new people” and “I tend to keep in the background on social occasions” 
(reverse-coded) (M = 4.59, SD = 1.10, α = .87)). The 9-item neuroticism scale (α = .94) 
included statements like “I would call myself tense or ‘highly strung’” and “I worry too 
long after an embarrassing experience” (M = 3.92, SD = 1.51). Higher values 
corresponded to higher levels of extraversion. 
Neuroticism. The 9-item neuroticism scale was similarly adapted from Eysenck, 
Eysenck, and Barrett’s (1985) original 12-item measure. It included statements like “I 
would call myself tense or ‘highly strung’” and “I worry too long after an embarrassing 
experience.” Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with such 
statements on a 7-point scale (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”), α = .94, M = 3.92, 




Age (M = 44.01, SD = 17.30), gender (52.5% female), education (52.2% 
bachelor’s degree or higher), and income (52.2% earned less than $75,000) were included 
given prior research showing to varying degrees that these characteristics influence 
attitudes towards technology (Katz et al., 1997). 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics show that overall, participants were most inclined to 
indicate liking robots (M = 4.54, SD = 1.40), followed closely by perceiving robots as 
human-like (M = 4.30, SD = 1.29). Participants were generally against the notion of a 
robot being entitled to rights (M = 2.73, SD = 1.60 (see Appendix F for the descriptive 
statistics across robots).  
Hypothesis Testing 
To examine the hypotheses and research questions raised in chapters 1 and 2, the 
general linear model (GLM) approach was employed. Based on the previous findings and 
research reviewed in chapter 2, the individual trait variables were predicted to covary 
with the dependent variables but not interact with the manipulated experimental 
variables. As such, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted first. However, 
in checking that the data met the assumptions of an ANCOVA, two violations were 
uncovered. The first was a violation of the linearity assumption for innovativeness, which 
upon inspection of the scatterplots, did not appear to linearly relate to any of the three 
dependent variables. Therefore, innovativeness was dropped from further analyses. The 
second and more critical issue was a violation of the homogeneity of regression slopes 
assumption: there was an interaction between the robot’s status and cultural perceptions 
of robots for “robot liking” (F(2) = 5.10, p = .001) and between the robot’s status and 
exposure to robots for “robot rights” (F(2) = 3.64, p = .027). 
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Given the violation of homogeneity of regression slopes, which indicated that the 
covariate might influence theoretical relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables, linear regressions were employed to appropriately investigate the 
nature of these relationships.2 Further, a linear regression allowed for entering the 
individual traits into blocks, such that the unique contributions of types of traits could be 
explored. The full models included robot features as independent factors and interaction 
terms along with the participants’ individual traits. The models for robot liking and rights 
entitlement also contained the interactions of individual traits and manipulated 
experimental variables that were discovered during the ANCOVA analysis: for robot 
liking, robot cultural view interacted with robot status and for robot’s rights entitlement, 
robot exposure interacted with status. The final hierarchical regression models were 
structured by first accounting for the technological features (block 1: robot traits) and 
then tested the individual traits (block 2: robot experience; block 3: demographics, block 
4: efficacy traits, and block 5: personality traits). Overall, these models explained 43.9% 
of the variance in robot liking (Table 4.1), 29.4% of the variance in perceived human-
likeness (Table 4.2), and 36.6% of the variance in perceptions of robots’ entitlement to 
rights (Table 4.3). All analyses were conducted using SPSS statistics.  
  
 
2 The ANCOVA and linear regression share some of the same assumptions, such as linearity, 
which were already determined to have been met once “innovativeness” was removed from the 
model. Other assumptions for the regression — independence of errors, homoscedasticity, lack of 
multicollinearity, lack of outliers, and normality of residuals — were checked and determined to 
have been met.  
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Table 4.1. Hierarchical linear regression modeling robot liking 
 Coefficient (B) Standard 
Error 
Beta (β) 
Constant 2.41*** .60   
Block 1: Robot traits 
Robot physical humanness -.05 .27 -.02 
Robot gender .41 .27 .15 
Robot status .11 .22 .06 
Robot gender x physical humanness -.03 .13 -.02 
Robot gender x status -.15 .08 -.18Ϯ 
Robot status x physical humanness .01 .08 .01 
ΔR2 = 1.3% 
Block 2: Robot experience 
Robot real-life exposure .20 .03 .21*** 
Robot mediated view  -.48 .09 -.36*** 
Robot mediated view x status .03 .04 .08 
ΔR2 = 32.5%*** 
Block 3: Demographics  
Age .01 .00 .11*** 
Participant gender -.18 .07 -.06* 
ΔR2 = 1.4%***    
Block 4: Efficacy traits 
Locus of control .26 .03 .25*** 
Perceived technology competence .27 .04 .23*** 
ΔR2 = 9.2%*** 
Block 5: Personality traits 
Neuroticism .04 .03 .02 
Extraversion  .05 .04 .04 
ΔR2 = 0.1%*** 
Notes: N = 1,020, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .439; Ϯp < 0.10; *p < 




Table 4.2. Hierarchical linear regression modeling robot perceived human-
likeness 
 Coefficient (B) Standard 
Error 
Beta (β) 
Constant 2.36*** .54   
Block 1: Robot traits    
Robot physical humanness .01 .27 .01 
Robot gender .08 .27 .03 
Robot status .06 .18 .04 
Robot gender x physical humanness .05 .14 .04 
Robot gender x status -.04 .08 -.05 
Robot status x physical humanness .00 .08 .00 
ΔR2 = 0.8%    
Block 2: Robot experience    
Robot real-life exposure .18 .03 .20*** 
Robot mediated view  -.29 .04 -.23*** 
ΔR2 = 22.0%***    
Block 3: Demographics     
Age -.001 .002 -.02 
Participant gender .04 .07 .01 
ΔR2 = 1.1%**    
Block 4: Efficacy traits    
Locus of control .22 .03 .23*** 
Perceived technology competence .13 .04 .12*** 
ΔR2 = 5.8%***    
Block 5: Personality traits    
Neuroticism .02 .03 .02 
Extraversion  .12 .04 .10* 
ΔR2 = 0.7%***    
Notes: N = 1,020, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .294; Ϯp < .10; *p < .05; 





Table 4.3. Hierarchical linear regression modeling robots’ 
rights entitlement 
 Coefficient (B) Standard  
Error 
Beta (β) 
Constant 1.36 .65   
Block 1: Robot traits 
Robot physical humanness -.07 .32 -.02 
Robot gender -.08 .33 -.03 
Robot status .23 .23 .11 
Robot gender x physical humanness .18 .16 .12 
Robot gender x status -.08 .10 -.08 
Robot status x physical humanness -.11 .10 -.08 
ΔR2 = 0.6%    
Block 2: Robot experience 
Robot real-life exposure .16 .08 .14* 
Robot exposure x status .02 .03 .04 
Robot mediated view  -.18 .04 -.11*** 
ΔR2 = 17.6%***    
Block 3: Demographics  
Age -.01 .003 -.13*** 
Participant gender -.37 .09 -.12*** 
R2 = 6.8%***    
Block 4: Efficacy traits 
Locus of control .45 .04 .38*** 
Perceived technology competence -.02 .04 -.01 
ΔR2 = 12.2%***    
Block 5: Personality traits 
Neuroticism .02 .04 .02 
Extraversion  .12 .04 .08** 
ΔR2 = 0.5%*    
Notes: N = 1,020, listwise deletion; overall Adjusted R2 = .366; Ϯp < .10; *p < .05; 





Influence of Robot Traits on Robot Humanization Perceptions 
The manipulated robot features — physical humanness, gender, and status — 
were included in the first block of the hierarchical regression models. As can be seen in 
Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, the robot’s traits overall had little influence on humanizing 
perceptions. Robot liking was affected the most, and even then robot traits explained only 
1.3% of the variance, F(6,1013) = 2.28, p = .04. However, for both perceived human-
likeness (F(1,1013) = 1.34, p = .24) and perceptions of rights’ entitlement (F(2, 1013) = 
1.01, p = .42), the models were not significant and contributed less than 1% to the 
measures’ variance.  
Effect of Physical Humanness on Liking, Perceptions of Human-Likeness, and 
Entitlement to Rights 
H1 predicted that humanoid robots (low physical humanness) will be perceived 
more favorably than android robots (high physical humanness) in terms of likability and 
perceived human-likeness. As can be seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, this hypothesis was not 
supported: there was no significant effect found of physical humanness on robot liking (β 
= -.03, p = .61) or perceived human-likeness (β = .03, p = .65). Answering RQ1, which 
asked whether robots’ physical humanness would influence perceptions of their rights’ 
entitlement, a similar non-effect was found: robots’ physical humanness appeared to have 
no influence on perceptions of rights’ entitlement (β = .06, p = .35). 
Effect of Gender on Liking, Perceptions of Human-Likeness, and Entitlement to Rights 
Influence of robot gender on perceptions 
Based on mixed findings in the literature about whether gender and robot 
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perceptions such as liking would be informed more by homophily or heterophily, RQ2a-c 
asked whether robot gender (male vs. female) would affect the ways that robots were 
perceived by men and women. Answering RQ2a, robot gender did not appear to 
influence perceptions of liking (β = .15, p = .13). Robot gender was also not a significant 
factor in perceptions of robots’ human-likeness (β = .06, p = .41), answering RQ2b, or 
their entitlement to rights (β = .06, p = .37), answering RQ2c. 
In order to determine whether male and female participants perceived male and 
female robots differently, two-way ANCOVAs were run with robot gender and 
participant gender as fixed factors, and individual traits included as covariates. Results of 
this test showed that there was no significant interaction between the participants’ gender 
and robots’ gender on liking (F(1) = .39, p = .53); perceived human-likeness (F(1) = .66, 
p = .42); or entitlement to rights (F(1) = .22, p = .64).  
RQ3 asked whether there were interactions between robots’ physical humanness 
and their gender on humanization perceptions. Across all three measures, there was no 
significant interaction effects of physical humanness and gender on perceptions liking (β 
= -.02, p = .84), human-likeness (β = .04, p = .74), and rights entitlement (β = .12, p = 
.26).  
Influence of participant gender on perceptions 
Finally, H2a-b predicted that men, compared to women, would perceive robots as 
more likeable and human-like, and RQ4 asked whether there were gender differences in 
perceptions of rights’ entitlement. H2a was fully supported: men perceived robots as 
significantly more likable (M = 4.86, SD = 1.37) than did women (M = 3.95, SD = 1.44; β 
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= -.06, p = 0.013 (Table 4.1). H2b, however, was not supported. Gender was not a 
significant predictor in the model for perceived human-likeness, β = .01, p = .64. 
Answering RQ4, gender appeared to matter for perceptions of robots’ rights’ entitlement. 
Men (M = 3.30, SD = 1.66) perceived robots as significantly more entitled to rights than 
did women (M = 2.22, SD = 1.36), β = -.12, p < .001). 
Effect of Status on Liking, Perceived Human-Likeness, and Entitlement to Rights 
H3a-c predicted that robots holding a higher status will be perceived as less 
likable, human-like, and entitled to rights. None of these hypotheses were supported: as 
can be seen in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, robot status was not a significant predictor of 
participants’ liking (β = .06, p = .63); perceived human-likeness (β = .03, p = .66); or 
rights entitlement (β = .11, p = .34).  
RQ5a-c asked whether there were interactions between robots’ status and their 
gender on humanizing perceptions. Answering RQ5a, there is some evidence that robot 
status interacts with gender in perception of liking. In the regression model, the robot 
gender X status interaction term shows that liking of a male robot was positively 
associated with status level, while the effect of status on liking was different for female 
robots, β = -.18, p = .06. Figure 4.1 depicts the dynamic at play: when positioned as an 
assistant or peer, male robots are liked less than when positioned as a superior; inversely, 
female robots are liked most as an assistant and then peer, and likability drops when 
female robots are situated as a superior. This interaction, which only approaches 
significance and therefore can only be tentatively interpreted, also only has an effect on 
robot liking. Answering RQ5b and RQ5c, there does not appear to be an interaction 
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between robot gender and status in perceptions of human-likeness (β = -.05, p = .63) and 
rights’ entitlement (β = -.08, p = .42).  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Difference in means in perceptions of robot liking by robot gender X robot 
status. 
 
RQ6 asked whether there was an interaction between robots’ physical humanness 
and status on humanization perceptions. There was no evidence for any interaction 
effects across the measures of robot liking (β = .01, p = .92), perceived human-likeness (β 
= .00, p = 1.00), or rights entitlement (β = -.11, p = .27).  
Influence of Individual Traits on Robot Humanization Perceptions 
Based on findings from previous studies and the extant literature, RQ8a-c asked 
about the extent to which certain individual traits would influence humanizing 
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perceptions of robots. These traits were grouped conceptually by domain-specific 
differences in prior robot experience as well as by more general differences in efficacy 
and personality traits.  
Effect of Robot Experience on Liking, Perceived Human-Likeness, and Entitlement to 
Rights 
RQ8a asked about the extent to which robot experience might influence 
perceptions of robots. Participants’ robot exposure (the amount of real-life exposure to 
robots in the home, workplace, or public) and their mediated view of robots (their 
valenced impressions of robots in general, cultivated from media depictions) were the 
most significant contributors to robot humanization perceptions. Together, they explained 
32.5% of liking, 22.0% of perceived human-likeness, and 17.6% of rights entitlement. 
The more participants have had real-life exposure to robots, the more they liked them (β 
= .21, p < .000), perceived them as human-like (β = .20, p < .000), and thought they were 
more entitled to rights (β = .14, p = .04). In a similar vein, when participants had 
cultivated a more negative view of robots from what they had seen in media portrayals, 
they liked them less (β = -.36, p < .000), perceived them as less human-like, (β = -.23, p < 
.000), and viewed them as less entitled to rights (β = -.11, p < .000).  
Effect of Demographics on Robot Liking, Perceived Human-Likeness, and Entitlement to 
Rights 
Overall, gender and age contributed relatively nominally to perceptions of liking 
(1.4%) and human-likeness (1.1%). In comparison, these traits explained 6.8% of 
perceptions of robots’ rights entitlement. The influence of the participant’s gender has 
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already been explored above in relation to the particular robot traits. To briefly 
summarize, men were more likely than women to view robots as more likable and 
entitled to rights (see Tables 4.1 and 4.3), whereas gender had no significant influence on 
the robot’s perceived human-likeness (Table 4.2). Age also appeared to have no influence 
on perceived human-likeness (β = -.02, p = .55), and it had differing effects on liking and 
rights’ entitlement perceptions. Specifically, those who are older like robots more (β = 
.11, p < .000) while younger people are more likely to perceive robots are more entitled 
to rights (β = -.13, p < .000).  
Effect of Efficacy on Liking, Perceived Human-Likeness, and Entitlement to Rights 
RQ8b asked about the extent to which efficacy traits might influence perceptions 
of robots. After robot experience, efficacy traits explained the most variance of the 
humanization perceptions: 9.2% of liking, 5.8% of human-likeness, and 12.2% of rights 
entitlement. Locus of control was significant for all three perceptions as well. Those who 
felt they were more capable of controlling what happened in their lives (e.g., higher 
internal locus of control) like robots less (β = .25, p < .000), perceived them as less 
human-like (β = .23, p < .000), and saw them as less entitled to rights (β = .38, p < .000). 
Those who perceived themselves as more technologically competent liked robots more (β 
= .232, p < .000) and perceived them as more human-like (β = .12, p < .000). However, 
one’s perceived technology competence had no significant effect on perceptions of 
robots’ rights entitlement, β = -.01, p = .733.  
Effect of Personality on Liking, Perceived Human-Likeness, and Entitlement to Rights 
Finally, RQ8c asked about the extent to which personality traits influenced 
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perceptions of robots. Very little additional explanation (less than 1%) to robot 
humanization perceptions was provided by personality traits after accounting for robot 
experience, and demographic and efficacy traits. Extraversion (β = .04, p = .13) appeared 
to have no effect on robot liking (Table 4.1), though extraverts were more likely to 
perceive robots as more human-like (β = .10, p = .001) and more entitled to rights (β = 
.08, p = .007). Neuroticism was not a significant predictor for robot liking (β = .02, p = 
.62), perceived human-likeness (β = .02, p = .63), or perceptions of rights entitlement (β = 
.02, p = .60).  
Summary 
By far, participants’ individual traits explained the most variance in humanizing 
perceptions of robots. Overall, the regression models show that robot traits have much 
less influence than individual differences do on perceptions of robot humanization. This 
is not to say that one’s experience of robots in general does not matter; indeed, one’s 
previous real-life and mediated exposure to robots appears to inform humanizing 
perceptions a great deal, as participants’ prior robot experience and efficacy traits were 
the strongest predictors of robot liking, perceived human-likeness, and perceptions of 
rights entitlement.  
In addition to prior robot experience, efficacy traits significantly contributed to 
perceptions, though in different directions. Domain-relevant efficacy — perceived 
technology competence — was positively related to robot liking and perceived human-
likeness, while overall efficacy — internal locus of control — was negatively related to 
all humanizing perceptions. In comparison, demographic traits were less explanatory, and 
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personality traits contributed the least additional explanation. Men were more likely than 
women to like robots and perceive them as more entitled to rights. Interestingly, older 
people liked robots more but they were less likely to perceive them as entitled to rights. 
Personality traits (extraversion, neuroticism) were less important overall — neuroticism 
was not related to any of the humanizing perceptions, while extraversion was positively 
related to perceptions of human-likeness and rights entitlement. The theoretical, 
methodological, and practical implications of these findings are discussed in the 
following two chapters.  
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
 
Summary 
This dissertation explored humanizing perceptions of robots that varied in aspects 
of human-like presentation. Specifically, the robots examined appeared more or less 
human, male or female, and were contextualized as lower, equivalent, or higher status. 
“Humanization” was conceptualized as three different variables that encompassed 
functional, relational, and metaphysical perceptions of robots: the extent to which 
subjects perceived them as human-like, liked them, and thought they were entitled to 
rights. Subjects’ personal traits were also considered, to determine whether there were 
individual differences in people’s inclinations to humanize robots. In this way, the 
human-like aspects that can be objectively manifest in a social robot’s presentation (both 
physical appearance and contextualization) and subjective humanization (the extent to 
which robots were perceived in a humanizing way) were analyzed in tandem: robot traits 
as fixed factors and humanizing perceptions as variable outcomes.  
The findings show that, by and large, robots’ traits have little influence in the 
extent to which people will humanize them. Physical humanness appeared to have little 
effect on humanizing perceptions: no significant differences were found across the 
humanoid less physical humanness) robot and android (more physical humanness) robot 
conditions. This was somewhat surprising, given the hypothesis set forth in the “uncanny 
valley,” which predicted that people’s feelings of unease towards robots would increase 
as the robot’s appearance approached more human-like presentation (Mori, 1970). 
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However, when others have attempted to statistically demonstrate the uncanny valley, the 
results have been less clear-cut, mapping imperfectly on Mori’s (1970) proposed non-
linear curve (Wang et al., 2015). Further, MacDorman and Entezari (2015) have found 
that individual differences predict to some extent people’s sensitivity to the uncanny 
valley, which might help explain the non-significant main effects in this study.  
Contrary to prior research (e.g., Powers & Kiesler, 2006, Carpenter et al., 2009, 
Siegel, Breazeal, & Norton, 2009, Eyssel & Hegel, 2012, Nomura, 2017), this study 
found no significant differences across the gender conditions, nor any significant 
interaction effects between participant’s gender and the robot gender. Findings have been 
mixed as to whether people prefer male or female robots, which may be a result of the 
outcome variables measured. For example, male robots have been preferred for taking 
advice from (Powers & Kiesler, 2006), but female robots have been favored (particularly 
by men) when asking for donations (Siegel, Breazeal, & Norton, 2009) and for in-home 
use (Carpenter et al., 2009). As Nomura (2017) suggests, the influence of robot gender 
varies depending on the context, and to that end this study found weak and tentative 
support for an interaction between the robot’s gender and status, discussed more below.  
The robot’s status alone — whether it was framed in a work context as superior, 
equal, or inferior relative to subjects — did not have a main effect on perceptions of 
humanization either. The results suggested a potential interaction in the robot’s status and 
gender; namely, that male robots would be liked more in higher status roles, while female 
robots would be liked more in lower status roles. This aligns somewhat with research that 
has found evidence that robot gender prompted projections of existing gender 
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stereotypes, as participants assigned the female robot to more stereotypically feminine 
and nurturing tasks (e.g., taking care of children and housework) while assigning male 
robots to more stereotypically masculine tasks (e.g., working with machines) (Eyssel & 
Hegel, 2012). It should be noted, though, that the present study’s observation of robot 
gender interacting with status was only marginally significant, and so it may not be 
generalizable to people outside of the study’s sample. This lack of definitive and strong 
support for similar gender stereotyping could be due to the dependent variables’ more 
general nature measuring humanization; further, Eyssel and Hegel (2012) asked 
participants to rate the suitability of specific tasks, such as care versus machine work, 
which may have elicited stronger gender heuristics than the more vaguely defined roles 
of assistant, colleague, and supervisor used in this study. Other explanations for the weak 
interaction could be that the sample size was too small or that the effect of the image-only 
stimulus was not powerful enough to emerge in this study. Indeed, some of the studies 
that have examined the influence of a robot’s relative positioning to the participant were 
conducting experiments in which the participants were asked to complete a task in 
collaboration with the robot (Hinds et al., 2004; Kim & Mutlu, 2014). This 
methodological implication will be discussed further below.  
Subjects’ individual differences, on the other hand, were strong predictors of 
robot humanization. Prior experience with robots — both through real-life exposure and 
media portrayals — was related to humanizing perceptions: the more real-life exposure 
subjects had with robots the more likely they were to humanize them, while those who 
have cultivated more negative views of robots through media portrayals were less likely 
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humanize them. This aligns with what Sundar and colleagues (2016) found in their 
proposed “Hollywood robot syndrome,” which Banks (2020) partially replicated: that 
there appears to be a cultivation effect from consuming media containing robots. 
However, Sundar and colleagues (2016) found that more mediated exposure improved 
attitudes towards robots, while Banks (2020) found amount of exposure had no effect, 
though the cultivated perceptions through particular portrayals was important in 
informing people’s mental models of robots.  
Efficacy traits were also important, though in different ways. Domain-pertinent 
efficacy — perceived technology competence — was positively related to humanization, 
while general efficacy — locus of control — was negatively related to humanization. In 
other words, those who felt more technologically competent were more likely to 
humanize robots. This finding corresponds to research that found domain-relevant 
efficacy (e.g., robot efficacy) was related to more acceptance of the technology (Latikka, 
Turja, & Oksanen, 2019). Importantly, Latikka and colleagues (2019) did not find an 
influence of general efficacy on robot acceptance, which was not the case for the present 
study. Those who felt more in control over what happened in their lives were less likely 
to humanize robots. Typically, efficacy is positively related to technology adoption (Lida 
& Chaparro, 2002; Abu-Shanab, 2011; Abay, Blalock, Berhane, 2017; Taffesse & 
Tadesse, 2017); indeed, locus of control has been included as a powerful antecedent in 
technology acceptance models (TAM) (Venkatesh, 2000; Tseng & Hsia, 2008; Hsia et 
al., 2012; Hsia, 2016; Jang, et al., 2016). The inverse influence of locus of control in the 




Gender and age had an influence on humanizing perceptions, which is consistent 
with what research has found in openness to other types of technology (e.g., Katz, 
Aspden, & Reich, 1997) and robots (e.g., Nomura et al., 2006, Nomura, 2017). Men and 
younger people tend to more readily adopt or like technology. This dynamic remained 
consistent for robot humanization. 
This study also considered whether socially relevant personality traits like 
extraversion and neuroticism affected humanizing perceptions. This was a pertinent 
question given people’s tendency to respond socially to machines (e.g., Reeves & Nass, 
1996, Nass & Moon, 2000), and these machines’ increasing capacity for interaction. 
Additionally, the studies that informed the present study’s design (summarized in Chapter 
2 and Appendix A) showed evidence that personality traits influenced social and general 
attitudes towards robots, as well as comfort with AI. However, the present study’s results 
showed that that extraversion and neuroticism had little influence above and beyond that 
already exerted by robot experience, efficacy, gender, and age. It seems that other 
individual determinants are at play with agentic social robots — specifically, that the 
autonomous, rather than interactive, aspect of this technology may be more important in 
someone’s perceptions.  
In summary, this study’s findings show that at the current stage of social robots’ 
proliferation — which is to say, very premature — individual differences matter a great 
deal to humanizing perceptions of robots. This is consistent with existing research on 
anthropomorphism: namely, that people vary in their anthropomorphic tendencies (Waytz 
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et al., 2014; Donath, 2019), which are also positively related to one’s social and 
emotional reactions to robots (Darling, 2015). The present study did not find much 
evidence of uniform, consistent responses to the human and social (e.g., gender and 
status) aspects of the robot. These findings, or lack-thereof, may have been related to the 
stimulus employed or the more speculative and general nature of the outcome variables, 
and these possibilities will be discussed further in the sections on methodological and 
theoretical implications, respectively. In the context of this study, though, what matters is 
one’s background and past experiences. As such, we might expect a great deal of 
individual variation in adoption of social robots, which could have implications for their 
subsequent use and proliferation. The methodological and theoretical implications of 
these findings are discussed in more depth below.  
Methodological Implications 
As summarized in the preceding section, little evidence was found for the robot’s 
features having an influence on humanizing perceptions. These null findings were 
surprising, and may be due in part to the methodological choices employed in the 
dissertation. Specifically, the findings may have been affected by the implementation of 
the experimental stimuli, study design and measurement, and the nature of the dependent 
variables.  
This study’s results demonstrate that, at least for the time being, people’s 
individual differences have a significant influence on the extent to which they will 
humanize robots, whereas the technological differences matter less. However, this 
conclusion can only be very tentatively drawn given the potential stimuli limitation. The 
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stimuli employed in the present study were robot images. In other words, subjects’ 
experience of the stimuli was two-dimensional, passive, and static. As such, the stimuli 
may have not had a very powerful effect. Subjects were asked to imagine dynamic 
experiences with the robots — as assistants, co-workers, or supervisors — yet they were 
not able to interact with them. This lack of interactivity and direct experience could have 
had a significant dampening effect on subjects’ impressions. Future online experiments 
similar to this one should consider employing more dynamic stimuli, such as gendered 
robot voices (as used in Edwards et al., 2019), accompanying the robot images with a 
voice recording, or video clips (as used in Zlotowski et al., 2017).  
It is also possible different results would have arisen from an in-person 
interaction. Robots’ features may matter a great deal more when presented physically and 
experienced directly. Further, the effect of robot status may be much more pronounced if 
it is a reality (or a more realistic possibility) in someone’s day-to-day life. In this way, the 
study’s design — exposing participants to a single robot and asking about perceptions of 
robots generally — departs from typical media equation study designs and other work in 
HMC and HCI. Media equation studies generally employ experiments with an interaction 
between subject and machine, and so behavior can be observed and self-reported answers 
are an in-the-moment (e.g., reflexive) response to the interaction. Conversely, some of 
the foundational HMC work (e.g., Guzman, 2020) is qualitative, which very explicitly 
privileges mindful processing over reflexive responses. Further, HCI experiments employ 
real robots (c.f. Goetz et al., 2003, Lee et al., 2006, Siegel et al., 2009) or images of 
robots (c.f. Eyssel & Hegel, 2012), and subjects’ answers are tied directly to perceptions 
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of the specific robot, rather than the general perceptions asked in the present study. On 
the other hand. Banks (2019) employed a similar method of an online experiment with 
static robot images and uncovered similar results in perceptions of mind in the robot, 
regardless of the robot’s morphology (which ranged from mechanical to android). 
Therefore, research should be extended to directly compare findings from in-
person interaction with robots and mediated exposure to robots. Such a comparison 
would illuminate not only methodological considerations but also potential friction 
between people’s mental models and heuristics of robots (c.f. Banks, 2020) and their 
reflexive responses to them. The implications of these possible discrepancies are 
discussed more in the following section. The study also relied solely on self-report 
measures to gauge perceptions. Although the sampling was based on age and gender 
quotas, there is still the potential for non-response error. Further, the opt-in and paid 
nature of the online survey method may result in some inaccurate responses, limiting 
generalizability. Although participants who answered all questions in the same way (e.g., 
“strongly agree” to every question)— indicating a lack of validity in their answers — 
were identified and removed from the dataset, and quality checks were employed to 
ensure valid responses, some participants may not have answered questions truthfully. 
The between-subjects design mitigates the risk of demand effects, but there is still a 
possibility that subjects were aware of the study’s purpose and responded accordingly.  
Measuring attitudes through self-reported questionnaires also limits the inferences 
that can be made about real-life, instinctual reactions and subsequent behavior. An in-
person experiment with a robot has the added benefits not only of more realistic 
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experiences (which may result in more intense attitudes) but also direct observations of 
subjects’ behaviors when interacting with the robot. If resources were plentiful, this exact 
online experiment would also be conducted in person, and observational data could be 
recorded and triangulated with the self-report measures. However, conducting this same 
experiment in person would require procuring at least four robots, exceeding the budgets 
common to many experiments seeking to systematically manipulate aspects of human-
robot interactions. In-person experiments are also not without their methodological faults, 
typically relying on much smaller sample sizes and using unnatural environments that 
could influence results. A field experiment would mitigate the confound of an artificial 
lab environment, but the issues of cost and sample size remain. A satisficing approach 
may be to choose more dynamic stimuli, such as video clips, to show in this type of 
online experiment. Too, more interactive designs employing virtual reality could better 
simulate real interaction. 
Finally, this dissertation contributes a conceptualization of robot humanization as 
a construct that complements anthropomorphism. Where anthropomorphism focuses 
more of seeing and attributing human traits in objects (Donath, 2019, Waytz et al., 2014), 
robot humanization emphasizes the second-order considerations for social adoption and 
assimilation. To that end, the study adapted two measures of robot perceptions that had 
previously been developed — perceived human-likeness and robot liking — and 
introduced a new measure of “robot rights.” This construct of robots’ rights entitlement 
needs to be explored further, as the exploratory work conducted here only captures one 
dimension, enumerated rights. Future research should expand on this construct to confirm 
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other dimensions of rights such as bodily autonomy — the ability to make one’s own 
decisions and control one’s own actions (Ashrafian, 2015). 
The study focused on the robot’s features and individual traits that may influence 
humanization perceptions. Future work should consider incorporating both individuals’ 
traits and additional robot perceptions such as anthropomorphism and mind perception to 
build out a fuller predictive model for robot humanization. There is likely a significant 
relationship between one’s tendency to anthropomorphize and perceive mind in robots 
and their inclination to humanize them, as research has found that anthropomorphism is 
linked to trust in automated vehicles (Waytz et al., 2014) and that there is individual 
variation in the tendency to anthropomorphize (Waytz et al., 2010). Further, the influence 
of individuals’ feelings of autonomy and locus of control should be explored in tandem 
with other robot-specific perceptions like human identity threat (identified in the “threat 
to human distinctiveness” hypothesis). Previous expansions on TAM found locus of 
control to be a powerful antecedent to perceptions of a technology’s usefulness and ease 
of use; similar work should be conducted with explorations of robot adoption and 
assimilation to determine the unique contributions of domain-dependent variables and 
more deep-seated domain-agnostic traits.  
Theoretical Implications 
Implications for Media Equation and Computers as Social Actors 
This dissertation drew on two complementary theories to serve as a basis for 
exploring robot humanization. Media equation (Reeves & Nass, 1996) — and more 
specifically the “computers as social actors” (CASA) paradigm (Nass & Moon, 2000) — 
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informed expectations for human-robot dynamics at the individual level. Previous 
findings from CASA, pre- robots and AI, indicated that people would respond socially to 
machines, mindlessly treating them as they would other humans. More recent theorizing 
around CASA (e.g., Gambino et al., 2020) has troubled that assumption, raising the 
possibility that the in the ensuing 20 years since CASA was formulated, unique scripts 
have been developed to respond specifically to machines. This could certainly be the 
case, as more recent studies (Bartneck et al., 2005, 2007; Edwards, Edwards, Westerman, 
& Spence, 2019) looking specifically at human responses to social machines like robots 
have not found unequivocal support for CASA. This may be due to evolving scripts and 
human behavior in response to machines; it could also be a response to the explicitly 
social nature that is already inherent in these technologies. 
The evolution of CASA findings suggests the possibility that, as people become 
more accustomed to interactions with technology, they adopt more tailored and mindful 
responses that are specific to the technology at hand. If this is the case, then individual 
differences will be more important in determining how people interact with machines 
moving forward. The present study showed that for social robots, at this stage of their 
proliferation — which is to say, very premature — one’s background and past 
experiences matter a great deal to humanizing perceptions of robots. To be clear, the 
study presented in this dissertation did not aim to test mindless responses to social robots. 
This was in part a pragmatic choice: there were no real-life robots with which to conduct 
a CASA experiment with in-person exchanges. Rather, the study’s focus was on mindful 
reactions to social robots, which was prompted by asking participants to imagine a 
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scenario with the pictured robot. As such, for the main purpose of this study, use of static 
images was sufficient. 
The earlier CASA studies that uncovered mindless social responses to computers 
may only be evidence for a temporary phenomenon that occurs with non-social machines 
— the elicited social response to the computer is more of a one-shot trigger of an 
impulse, rather than evidence of an enduring behavior. Indeed, in the CASA studies that 
found differing responses to humans than to machines, the machines was positioned more 
explicitly as a social actor already. There may be an important difference in people’s 
behavior with machines when they are occupying social roles already. When machines 
are placed in social roles at the outset, people’s responses to them may be more mindful. 
The lack of significant CASA findings in the current study may be due to methodological 
constraints (as discussed above), or it could suggest the possibility that machines in overt 
social roles are treated differently — more mindfully — than machines such as 
computers that signal implicit social cues. More research is needed to disentangle the 
differing effects of the nature and framing of the machines under study, the 
methodological nature of the study, and the time-based effects of the responses to the 
machines.  
Moving forward, CASA-based theorizing should therefore distinguish between 
enduring versus temporary responses to these technologies. Others (e.g., Lobato, 
Wiltshire, & Fiore, 2013, in Banks, 2020) have proposed a type-1 (automatic, mindless 
reaction) and type-2 (delayed and conscious evaluation) approach to understanding 
human-robot interaction. Just as both types of processing are present in human-human 
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interaction, both are possible and likely to co-occur in HRI, such that considering both 
people’s mental models for robots as well as their reflexive reactions — and how these 
are integrated — is critical for a complete evaluation of human-robot dynamics. Kahn 
and colleagues (2011) have suggested that a new ontological category should be created 
to capture the nature of social robots, which are seen both as non-human but also 
containing human attributes. Such a categorization may help inform people’s mental 
schema of and demystify social robots such that people have clearer heuristics to guide, 
and less uncertainty of, interactions with robots.  
The ontological leap described in the first chapter was formulated as a 
conceptualization for bridging the phenomena of mindless and mindful responses to 
machines. Starting from the assumption that social responses to machines are mindless, 
what are the implications if, when mindful processing initiates the machines are viewed 
ontologically as non-human interactants? This question cannot be answered in a single 
study but merits an exploration to identify what the baseline currently is for humanizing 
perceptions of robots. The mindful responses to social robots should be examined in 
tandem with media equation work, in order to expand the theory to consider the longer-
term social implications of these individual-level responses. Further, as the present 
study’s findings on the importance of individual differences in robot exposure and 
efficacy suggest, some people may be more inclined, mindfully, to humanize robots than 
others. As such, these people may have shorter leaps to take or, due to greater experience, 
be further along in the leap than others. These discrepancies across individuals may have 
implications for adoption and subsequent technology-related opportunities for them (this 
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possibility is discussed more in the final chapter).  
Implications for Apparatgeist 
The second theoretical pillar for this study — apparatgeist — is useful here to 
consider the eventual process of adoption and assimilation. Where CASA studies 
phenomena at the individual level, Apparatgeist broadens the scope of inquiry to both the 
individual and social levels. Apparatgeist is not a predictive theory in terms of generating 
hypotheses about use that may be falsified or supported. Indeed, we cannot predict the 
ways in which a technology will be adapted and assimilated — this is necessarily a 
process that unfolds over time and is shaped by the individuals using the technology. 
This last point is critical because it suggests people, both individually and 
collectively as a culture, have at least some agency over the technological and social 
shaping of their world. Apparatgeist is more of a descriptive theory and its utility here is 
in its emphasis on a holistic consideration of technology as not just an amalgamation of 
affordances, but also as a symbolic object in the configuration of people’s social lives. 
This study’s findings indicate that perceptions of social robots are not yet at the level of 
affordances: social robots are seen as a single bucket or category, rather than as a 
composite of features that variably influence users’ attitudes and behavior. To that end, 
this study asked about humanizing perceptions in order to begin to discern how this 
technology may be conceived of more symbolically. It did not ask exclusively about 
functionality, whether people would like to use the robot or whether they thought it 
would be useful. The goal here was to consider social robots’ functionality and look 
towards broader attitudes of socialization and assimilation. 
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Functionally, social robots and the attendant artificial intelligence (AI) technology 
that power them extend beyond our existing conceptualization of how technology is 
“used.” A smartphone is manually unlocked and navigated with our fingertips (and 
sometimes our voice); actions on the computer are done through manipulating a mouse 
and typing on a keyboard. In short, our personal communication technology (PCT) so far 
has primarily consisted of interfaces and devices that are engaged with through the user’s 
control. While social robots and AI may be approached as interfaces and devices, their 
capacity for autonomous action represents a new category of media that challenges 
fundamental, extant assumptions about how PCTs and other media operate. As such, 
research on this technology must look further than models of technology design and 
affordances and iterate on existing theories of human behavior and psychology. 
For example, the present study did not find evidence that people attributed more 
humanness to the more human-appearing robots. This finding runs counter to an 
affordance-based, technologically deterministic prediction, which would have assumed 
that more human a robot appears, the more it would be perceived as human. It may be 
that there is a threshold effect of a robot’s physical humanness: the robots examined in 
this study all take a human-enough shape; the humanoids still had legs, arms, a torso, and 
a face; on top of these features, the androids also had skin, hair, and wore clothing. The 
humanizing leap could be farther down the scale of physical humanness, and the absence 
of certain human features that both of this study’s robot types had is what makes the 
difference. Future research might incorporate a wider array of robot types to tease apart 
whether such a threshold exists and at what level of physical humanness it resides.  
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In that vein and within the parameters of this study, people’s prior experiences 
with and preconceptions of robots was very important for humanizing perceptions, 
emphasizing the point that social robots may represent more of a single idea than a varied 
technology with a wide array of use-cases. In apparatgeist terms, there may be a “folk” 
conceptualization of social robots that are based more on their symbolic import than on 
their functional design. In order words, social robots may come to represent something in 
people’s lives that is greater than their literal function, in the same way that mobile 
phones symbolize a “perpetual contact” that extends from their functionality but means 
much more for people’s lives and relationships. This aligns with other research that has 
found people’s opinions and behaviors during interactions with communicative AI 
technologies were influenced by how they conceived of and categorized AI as a 
communicator (Dautenhahn et al., 2005; Sundar, 2008). As such, understanding, 
ontologically, how humans perceive AI and social robots will be essential for tracking 
how this technology and society co-evolve in the iterative and dynamic process that 
apparatgeist suggests: human and social values inform development and design, which in 
turn influence how it may be assimilated; within the basic parameters of the technology, 
humans adapt its use to their own needs, which in turn may influence further 
development and design. Thus, the fundamental nature of this emergent technology and 
the ways in which it may interact with individual differences will be important to 
continue to explore.  
Implications for Human-Machine Communication 
The argument put forth for the HMC research agenda is to consider the 
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metaphysical and social alongside the functional, because each surely will impact one 
another. The present study provides some evidence to that effect in the findings about 
how one’s locus of control influences humanizing perceptions. After accounting for prior 
robot experience, efficacy traits, including locus of control, were strong predictors of 
humanizing perceptions. This would suggest that the question of agency goes both ways 
— relevant not only as a technological feature but also as an individual trait that informs 
the “user’s” experience of the technology. Contrary to previous findings that efficacy is 
related to more openness to and increased adoption of technology, in the case of agentic 
technology, personal efficacy (e.g., the degree to which someone feels able to control 
their life) was negatively related to humanizing perceptions. This was particularly true in 
the case of robot rights: locus of control was the strongest predictor of whether one 
perceived a robot as entitled to rights. In contrast, one’s perceived technology 
competency was not even significant in predicting rights perceptions, where it had been a 
relevant aspect of liking and perceived human-likeness. 
Robot rights was included as a foray into quantitatively capturing the 
metaphysical dynamics that might be at play with social robots. Guzman (2020) has 
found qualitatively that there are several “ontological divides” that will likely influence 
people’s attitudes towards and interactions with emergent AI technologies: from the 
literature, she identified origin of being, autonomy, emotion, intelligence, and 
communication as divides. From qualitative interviews, she identified two additional 
divides: tool/tool users and inherent flaws. These divides are aspects of how people 
understand the nature of the technologies that may stymie or otherwise affect their 
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stances towards and use of them. Importantly, at least at this point in time, the present 
study’s findings suggest that the extent to which robots appear more human has little 
bearing on how much people will humanize them, or to adapt Guzman’s (2020) language, 
narrow the ontological gap that arises from these divides.  
In fact, the present study’s findings suggest that these perceptions of the 
fundamental differences between human nature and machine nature may become more 
glaring and emphasized as agentic machines encroach more in everyday life. Those with 
higher internal loci of control were much less likely to humanize robots, and this trait was 
particularly salient in perceptions of robots’ rights entitlement. Extrapolating a bit, it 
seems that those who feel more in control of their lives — who feel they personally have 
more agency — in turn feel more threatened by the technology’s agency. This 
interpretation corresponds with the “threat to distinctiveness” hypothesis (Ferrari et al., 
2016): increased agency in robots led to increased feelings of human identity threat, 
which resulted in more negative attitudes towards robots.   
Guzman (2020) and others (e.g., Sundar, 2020, Guzman & Lewis, 2019) have 
rightly pointed to social robots’ and AI’s capacity for agency as a critical component to 
understanding behavior towards and attitudes of the technology. Sundar (2020) has 
located agency as an affordance of AI, such that it fits within his existing MAIN 
(modality, agency, interactivity, navigability) model. Thinking about AI and social robots 
more holistically, however, this dissertation would argue that agency rises above the level 
of an affordance, given the findings that individuals’ personal sense of agency also 
influences perceptions of social robots. In the context of HMC, agency within AI is not 
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simply a technological trait but a fundamental paradigm shift for how people have 
typically approached technology. 
As such, in their research agenda for HMC, Guzman and Lewis (2019) asserted 
that AI and people’s interactions with it do not correspond as well with communication 
theory paradigms, which are premised on human-human communication. Guzman and 
Lewis (2020) do not just identify AI technology as a communicative entity — rather than 
a channel — as a matter of semantic precision. The advancement of our technology to an 
agentic, communicative partner challenges the very anthropocentric paradigm from 
which we understand the world. Viewing the unique aspects of social robots and AI 
primarily through an affordances lens prioritizes the functional considerations and 
minimizes or disregards the social, and to a greater extent the metaphysical, implications 
of this technology. 
Therefore, it seems important to determine ontologically how social robots and AI 
are understood, and also how these conceptualizations interact with individuals’ life 
experiences and personal traits. If we are indeed entering a “third wave” in HCI that is 
characterized by a “relational turn” (Gunkel, 2018c) with this technology, it is critical to 
understand both the influence of various technological features as well as the various 
ways that individuals orient to the technology. These orientations may be informed at 
psychological as well as social factors. In this way, communication and HMC are 
uniquely suited to study the impact of AI and social robots, as fields that are not confined 
to a certain level of analysis (Paisley, 1984, in Park, Eveland Jr, & Cudeck, 2008). Social 
change begins at the individual level, establishes new norms and social rules on a broader 
 
99 
scale, which in turn affects people at the individual level.  
Of course, the creation and establishment of new norms and “interaction rituals” 
(Goffman, 1967) is a process that will occur over an extended period of time, with 
technological developments continuing in the meantime. This process cannot be 
predicted or captured in a single cross-sectional study and will need to be studied 
longitudinally. To that end, there is no surefire, cross-sectional method for studying robot 
humanization. A significant limitation is that people so far have minimal, if any, 
experience with humanoid and android robots as they are not yet widely proliferated and 
adapted. At this moment in time they are still a novelty, which will necessarily affect the 
external validity and generalizability of any findings. For example, as a speculative 
question currently, robot rights appear to have little support amongst a sample of U.S. 
citizens, and it may feel inappropriate or unnecessary to participants to consider now, 
when social robots are far away from everyday features in our lives. It could very well be 
that now, in 2020, it is too early in an ontological leap to detect certain patterns of 
humanization that will emerge; indeed, the importance of the robot experience variables 
— real life and mediated exposure — indicate that more daily exposure to robots in the 
future may result in changing attitudes and perceptions. Capturing public sentiment at 
this point in 2020, though, provides a baseline from which to observe these changes over 
time. It will be important to continue capturing such cross-section data and aggregate 
these observations so that trends in humanization and other robot perceptions can be 
observed and tracked longitudinally over years, if not decades.  
This dissertation offers an approach to capture aspects of robot humanization but 
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is merely a starting point. Triangulating methods is important. Qualitative work would 
provide in-depth information on how ontologically people conceive of social robots, 
which could then inform the development of more precise quantitative designs and 
measures. Content analyses of the media landscape would be another fruitful avenue: 
according to this study’s findings and others’ (e.g., Banks, 2020), conceptions of robots 
cultivated from the media are important factors in people’s attitudes to potential robots in 
their “real” lives. Analyzing how robots are portrayed across various media would 
provide more clarity on what kinds of perceptions are more likely to be cultivated; 
pairing that analysis with a survey measuring people’s robot-media consumption would 
help further elucidate the relationship between mediated and real-life conceptions. 
Finally, as stated earlier, longitudinal research that cuts across these methodologies will 
be critical to understanding the individual and social impact of robots and AI in our lives. 
This will help advance our theoretical understanding of how technology is adopted and 
assimilated. It may be that as social robots become more present in people’s lives, the 
particular affordances matter more. For now, however, this study’s findings suggest that 
technological differences matter less than the ontological understanding that social robots 
as a category may have in people’s humanizing perceptions. The next, and final, chapter 




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION: BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL 
ROBOTS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
Introduction 
The last decade has seen a rapid progression in not only robotic and AI 
technologies but also the human-machine relationships that may form. Military personnel 
form attachments to the robots that assist them with explosive ordinance disposal 
(Carpenter, 2016). The robot dog Aibo has been mourned and given an official Buddhist 
funeral (Connellan, 2018). The android robot Sophia was granted citizenship from Saudi 
Arabia (Vincent, 2017). While this last example may have been primarily a publicity 
stunt, the ensuing attention and outcry highlight the pressing problem of social robots, 
namely, how they should be treated and integrated into our civic and social lives.  
Some countries are preemptively addressing this question. The European Union, 
for example, has established a “Commission of the Civil Law Rules on Robotics” and has 
been actively proposing rules and regulations in a range of categories relevant to AI 
technology (Walch, 2020). A 2017 European Parliament report has already made legal 
recommendations around the possibility of granting autonomous robotic entities 
“electronic personalities” as a kind of legal personhood in order to preempt liability 
issues. Although the EU has not adopted or legalized the robot personhood measure, such 
consideration demonstrates that European countries are actively engaged with and 
debating these questions as imminent legal and ethical matters (Delcker, 2014).  
This dissertation focused on the United States, which appears to be taking more of 
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a “wait-and-see” approach to AI and robotic technology (Walch, 2020). To a large 
degree, private companies and their engineers are driving the development and 
innovation in this area, which is potentially a cause for concern. In the excitement over 
pushing the boundaries of what technology can do, we risk losing sight of critically 
examining what it should do. Determining these parameters and boundaries is impossible 
without a human-centered approach that extends beyond the question, what will make 
humans more likely to use this technology? 
This concluding chapter addresses the broader social issues at stake with social 
robots and AI technology that the dissertation speaks to. Social robots were the 
technology on which the present study focused, but the work leading up to this 
dissertation encompassed both social robots as well as AI, the technology that powers 
them. Both social robots and AI more generally share the characteristics of autonomy. 
Social robots are embodied instantiations of AI, which adds another potential layer to 
interactions and perceptions with the technology: sharing a fundamental aspect of human 
action (e.g., autonomy) as well as human form. 
In examining the factors that might influence people’s humanizing perceptions of 
social robots, the present study found that individual differences in experience with 
robots and efficacy influenced these tendencies. As such, this final chapter will first cover 
the possibility of a new kind of digital divide, an automation divide, that may arise from 
people’s disparate openness to automation technology. The present study did not find 
much evidence that the robot’s human features (e.g., human-likeness and gender) had a 
strong effect on humanizing perceptions, which suggests that designers of social robots 
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have an opportunity to make purposeful and prosocial design choices, such as avoiding 
designs that could reinforce problematic stereotypes or human-human dynamics. 
Therefore, this chapter next discusses these opportunities in light of contemporary trends 
in robots’ appearance and roles, and the ways that the technology could be designed with 
an eye toward social parity. This issue of parity in design is particularly important if the 
tendency will be to dehumanize social robots. The chapter concludes by raising the 
possibility of human-robot interactions translating to human-human dynamics, and 
considers the potential implications for human dehumanization as a result of humanizing 
social robots. 
Acceptance of Automated Technologies: A New Digital Divide? 
The digital divide has been a critical area of study in the last few decades, as 
(non) access or use of the Internet results in inequality of opportunities across many 
sectors (van Dijk, 2006). In the United States, efforts have been undertaken to increase 
high-speed Internet access (Wigfield, 2015), acknowledging the extent to which the 
Internet is crucial for obtaining information, communicating with others, expressing 
oneself, and engaging in civic life. While AI does not yet have the ubiquity of the 
Internet, it is increasingly being incorporated into multiple sectors of people’s everyday 
lives and their interpersonal communication (Hancock, Naaman, & Levy, 2020). 
Prognostications about AI and robotic technology range widely from utopian visions to 
apocalyptic nightmares. This speaks both to the technology’s vast potential and our 
uncertainty about how its power will be used. A 2018 Pew Research report that surveyed 
over 1,000 experts on where they envisioned AI would be by 2030 highlighted this 
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tension between the technology’s power, potential, and use (Anderson & Rainie, 2018). 
Experts emphasized that AI in and of itself is neutral; who wields it and to what ends are 
the critical questions. AI has the potential to significantly augment human capabilities, 
but it also threatens humans’ “autonomy, agency, and capabilities” (Anderson & Rainie, 
2018, p. 2). 
As a system rather than a piece of hardware, AI has been incorporated into our 
existing tools and devices: e-mail clients that suggest wording for our missives, 
smartphones with a voice assistant included. One can imagine a time soon when today’s 
virtual assistants may manifest as physically embodied entities. Given this, some have 
introduced the idea of AI-enabled social robots as not just mediators of communication 
and basic assistant tools, but communication partners themselves (Höflich, 2013, 
Guzman, 2018a, Guzman & Lewis, 2019, Spence, 2019, Sundar, 2020). Sandry (2018) 
argues that productive human-robot collaboration will rely on a recognition of the robot’s 
“liveliness” and agency. People should leverage the robot’s “nonhuman advantages … 
rather than [seek] to control it as a tool” (p. 53).  
This point about collaboration is where this dissertation’s findings suggest an 
automation divide could likely occur. Individual differences in people’s locus of control, 
and those who feel like they have more personal control of their lives, could resist use of 
and productive collaboration with AI and social robots. As this technology proliferates, 
such a resistance could limit work opportunities and introduce friction in personal lives. 
As such, it will continue to be important to understand individual barriers to positive 
perceptions and use of AI and social robots as they become more commonplace. We 
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should be wary of how a commensurate automation divide could leave behind some 
groups that may be more avoidant of or resistant to this emerging technology. While 
some researchers and stakeholders hail the ways in which AI will augment and expand 
human capabilities, there is likewise concern that increased dependency on AI will erode 
people’s abilities to think for themselves and that more AI-enabled automatized decision-
making may encroach on people’s independence and control of their own lives (Anderson 
& Rainie, 2018, Sundar, 2020). Unlike the Internet, which is opt-in and expands people’s 
opportunities for action and communication, AI and its ancillary applications may very 
well limit people’s possibilities by pre-determining certain outcomes or courses of action. 
The purpose of AI is to learn from existing data (e.g., of prior behavior and outcomes) in 
order to make predictions that can inform future actions or outcomes. Such a model relies 
on assumptions of uniform and consistent behavior, which curtails the potential for future 
action to deviate significantly from past performance. It is likely this functioning that 
explains why those with a higher internal locus of control are less comfortable with AI. 
At the same time, such an understanding of the technology may position some people to 
optimize AI or work around it for their benefit, while others may be unknowingly 
affected. For example, AI has long been used in criminal justice, recommending 
sentences and bail decisions, which has only reinforced the racial bias and inequality that 
existed in the system (Osoba & Welser, 2017).  
Social science research about AI has been focused on the AI market disruption, 
economic growth possibilities, and civil implications as well as threats to privacy, human 
agency, and national security (West & Allen, 2018; Anderson & Rainie, 2018; Brundage 
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et al., 2018), but offers less evidence on how non-expert users (and non-users) actually 
perceive AI and robotic technologies. This dissertation provided some insight into how 
such an automation divide might manifest across individuals, particularly in how much 
prior experience people have had with the specific technology and their feelings of 
competency towards technology generally. The findings also suggest a potential divide 
along gender lines, which may have particular implications for work and economic 
opportunities. Specifically, women were much less open to AI technology and social 
robots, which aligns with existing reports of a severe gender gap in the AI workforce 
(UNESCO, 2019). As discussed further in the next section, such a gender gap likely has 
design implications, from which larger social and cultural inequities may extend.  
Gendering Robots: To what End? 
In 2019, the United Nations released a report that called for greater gender equity 
in AI development, citing the relative paucity of female engineers and designers. The 
report posited that such a gender disparity in the creators of technology would result, and 
have resulted, in biased design of products like digital voice assistants and in the future, 
robots (UNESCO, 2019). For example, the extant predecessors to social robots that are 
currently on the market — digital voice assistants, otherwise known as Alexa, Siri, 
Cortana — are all assistive and they are all female-voiced. Their GPS predecessors, once 
people became comfortable with the devices (initially, they did not like taking directions 
from a woman), were also mostly female-voiced. A man’s 2010 ode to his GPS in a New 
York Times op-ed credits the dulcet navigator for helping his marriage: solely serving 
him, with “efficiency and attention,” instead of asking for what his wife desires, 
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“kindness and equality” (Feiler, 2010). In contrast, IBM’s super-computer, Watson, is 
male-voiced. 
As mentioned in this dissertation’s first chapter, this predominance of female-
voiced assistants and the explosive growth of their adoption continues to elicit questions 
about how they both reflect gender bias, and the ways in which they may reify and spread 
gender stereotypes that stymie society’s progress towards gender equality (Woods, 2018). 
Indeed, media psychologist and robotics researcher Martina Mara has argued “for more 
women in robotics, not for more female robots!” (Ars Electronica, 2017). Mara’s 
exhortation highlights both the gender inequity in those who design these technologies, as 
well as the potential negative consequences of such a gap.  
Gender, distinct from biological sex, is more of a social construct than an 
immutable trait, and therefore is malleable, fluid, and not inevitable. There are 
physiological differences derived from biological sex, and to some extent these have 
informed gender characteristics. Without getting sidetracked by a debate about 
evolutionary biological determinism versus social constructivism, the salient point here is 
that robots do not have a biological sex. As such, any gendered features attributed to 
robots are entirely socially constructed. This fact therefore begs the question, why gender 
robots at all?  
The disconcerting truth is that this question does not appear to be top of mind for 
the creators of these technologies. In her exploration of Japanese roboticists, almost all of 
whom were male, Robertson (2010) observed that “gender for them constitutes common-
sense knowledge, or a cognitive style through which they experience the social world” (p. 
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4). In other words, they use the robot’s gender as a heuristic shortcut to convey the 
robot’s role and capabilities. The particular danger, here, is the simplification of gender to 
its most base stereotypes. As Robertson argues, male and female bodies do contain a 
great deal of variability in their biological capabilities, and that variability is erased when 
applied to robots: “humanoid robot bodies are effectively used as platforms for reducing 
the relationship between bodies and genders from a contingent relationship to a fixed and 
necessary one” (Robertson, 2010, p. 6).  
In the particular context of Japan, from which Robertson’s (2010) fieldwork was 
based, the development of humanoid robots was funded by the government as part of a 
solution to the country’s demographic problems: namely, the declining birthrate and 
aging population that would create a workforce shortage crisis. Humanoid robots were 
identified to buoy the workforce and provide more domestic help, which might induce 
more Japanese women to marry and bear children (Robertson, 2010). In fulfilling Japan’s 
Humanoid Robotics Project, “roboticists reinforce[d], in and through their humanoids, by 
default arising from indifference, quite unprogressive notions of gender dynamics and the 
sexual division of labor” (Robertson, 2010, p. 28). It has been argued, too, that 
reinforcing these gender hierarchies will be damaging for both genders. Roff (2016) 
observed in the designs put forth for “warbots” the extent to which their physicality 
reinforced tropes of hyper-masculinity, speculating that “this will solidify a version of 
hegemonic masculinity, and further factionalize and subordinate all other masculinities 
and femininities” (p. 12).  
Robertson (2010) refers to this phenomenon as “retro-tech:” creating advanced 
 
109 
technologies to serve traditional values. More recently, some scholars have called for a 
more critical examination of this retro-tech-by-default mode. Most studies testing the 
effect of robot gender (including this one) imbue stereotypical traits in the robot — pink 
vs. grey lips (Kuchenbrandt, Häring, Eichberg, Eyssel, & André, 2014), different body 
shapes (Tay, Jung, & Park, 2014), and hair length (Eyssel & Hegel, 2012), as some 
examples — and then test whether participants stereotype based on these gendered 
characteristics alone. As a notable exception, Dufour and Ehrwein Nihan (2016) tested 
whether a robot’s technical attributes could overcome this gender stereotyping. They 
found that when presented with a female and male robot with no additional information, 
people applied gender stereotypes, preferring the male robot for heavier mechanical 
tasks. However, when provided with details about the robot’s capabilities (e.g., both 
female and male robots were described as able to lift heavy weights), the effect of 
stereotypes disappeared and both robots were rated as equally suitable for the task. In 
short, they found that “the effect of human stereotypes on the judgments of robots is not 
inevitable” (Dufour & Ehrwein Nihan, 2016, p. 8), because participants were also able to 
evaluate the robot based on technical features.  
Londa Schiebinger, a professor of the history of science, called for roboticists to 
take a “Hippocratic oath” that their work would help, or at least not damage, social 
equality (Schiebinger, 2019). She provides several possible avenues to this end. On the 
gender question specifically, she suggests designing robots that challenge current gender 
stereotypes or designing genderless and/or gender-fluid robots. To eliminate the top-
down imposition of appearance-task alignment, robots could also be customizable and 
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users choose their features. Another possibility is to remove robots from human social 
relations entirely. Her final suggestion is to create specific identities for robots that 
circumvent existing social stereotypes. 
Schiebinger’s (2019) final suggestion particularly aligns with chapter 5’s 
discussion on ontologically classifying robots. This dissertation’s study provided some 
evidence that gender inequities may be perpetuated with gendered robots, with male 
robots perceived more favorably than female robots in high-status positions. This is a 
social stereotype — then men are better suited than women as bosses — that could be 
challenged, or at least not reinforced, with conscious design choices. Indeed, this 
dissertation showed that individual differences in robot experience and efficacy inform 
perceptions of robots above and beyond the robot’s specific features, suggesting that 
people conceive of robots overall in one ontological bucket. As such, it seems there is an 
opportunity at this nascent stage of social robot’s development and proliferation to make 
considered and prosocial design considerations, in line with Schiebinger’s (2019) 
recommendations. In particular, rather than ascribing human-derived attributes on robots, 
more work could be invested in creating identities for robots that are less anthropocentric.  
An alternative to non-anthropocentric identities for robots could be a concerted 
push for expansive representation of human identities in robots. A recent example of this 
is the development of “Q,” hailed by its developers as “the first genderless voice 
assistant” (genderlessvoice.com). Q was created as a composite of several different 
voices to produce one indiscernible voice. One of its developers, Julie Carpenter has 
spoken anecdotally of how non-binary individuals expressed to her their joy in 
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encountering a digital entity that sounded like them (Mortada, 2019). 
The importance of representation in other forms of media has already been 
established: there is both an extreme imbalance in the ways that and frequency with 
which white men are portrayed in film and TV relative to spaces taken up by white 
women, and minority men and women (Smith, Choueiti, & Piper, 2017). This has 
cumulative effects that extend beyond the screen by increasing racial bias and 
stereotyping among white people and lowering self-esteem among those 
underrepresented groups (e.g., anyone who is not a white male) (Yuen, 2017). Identifying 
the inequality of media representations has not solved it; this is still very much an 
ongoing effort. Decades of racism and sexism in Hollywood cannot be unspooled 
overnight, and continued vigilance and advocacy will be needed. Given this history, it 
seems imperative to turn the same critical lens to our emergent technology now, before 
precedents are firmly set and habits entrenched. As such, cross-disciplinary collaboration 
between engineers, social scientists, and humanists will be important to ensure 
responsible and prosocial development of this technology, as well as establish inclusive 
ethical standards that do not leave out or harm sectors of the public (Schiebinger, 2019). 
For example, is there a scenario wherein a domestic servant-type robot could be 
reasonably representative of the population? At least in a U.S. context, given this 
country’s history with subjugation of and racism against Black people, it seems 
unimaginable that a diverse representation of such a robot would be ethical or 
responsible. At the same time, it seems contrived and problematic in a different way to 
order that domestic robots should only be white. This is one possible complication among 
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many others that could arise with the development of human-aping social robots.  
Only a handful of models of android robots have been developed so far, and so it 
is important to examine these questions now. What purpose does a robot with a 
discernible gender or a certain skin color serve? Could a more mechanical-appearing 
robot serve that same purpose, and if so, why bother increasing its human realism? The 
current dissertation study demonstrated that the jump up to an android robot from a 
humanoid had little effect on humanizing perceptions. As such, even if the goal for social 
robots extends beyond the functional to the relational (as per a human-machine 
communication perspective), ascribing more human-appearing traits — which may 
introduce complications for human-human dynamics (discussed in the following section) 
— seems to be unnecessary. At least where the technology is now, the readiness for 
taking any kind of ontological leap is within the people who behold the technology, not 
within the technology itself. Of course, humanization may not be the goal, but the salient 
point for this section is that the development of this technology should be guided both by 
clear goals for its purpose and consideration of the society-wide implications of the 
design choices.  
Humanizing Social Robots, Dehumanizing Humans?  
There are two primary concerns with the ascription of human traits like gender 
and race onto robot bodies. The first is the connection of those traits to various social 
roles the robot might take on, such as a house servant or a boss, which could then reify 
damaging stereotypes, as described in the section above. Functionally, stereotypes reduce 
one’s understanding of another person to a single trait or set of traits. In other words, it 
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dehumanizes them, which is the second concern and focus of this final section. 
Dehumanization has been defined broadly as denying someone an identity — 
both as a unique individual capable of making their own decision and as a member of a 
community of individuals who care for one another (Kelman, 1973, in Haslam 
&Loughnan, 2014). According to Haslam and Loughnan (2014), “when people are 
divested of these agentic and communal aspects of humanness they are deindividuated, 
lose the capacity to evoke compassion and moral emotions, and may get rated as means 
toward vicious ends” (p. 401)  
It is important to reiterate here, as laid out in the Chapter 1, that robots are, in a 
definitional sense, inherently dehumanized. Their starting point is as non-human, and the 
processes of anthropomorphism and humanization unfold individually and, over time 
potentially, more broadly across society. Haslam (2006) expanded on early 
conceptualizations and proposed two dimensions of dehumanization: animalistic and 
mechanistic. Animalistic dehumanization denies the targets attributions of “unique 
humanness” such as higher cognition, civility, and morality. Mechanistic dehumanization 
denies the targets attributions of “human nature” that represent the “core properties of 
humanness” such as cognitive flexibility, emotionality, and warmth (Haslam, 2006). As 
may be clear by its name, mechanistic dehumanization is more applicable to technology 
like social robots and aligns more with the robot’s inability to experience human things 
like hunger, pain, and joy (Broadbent, 2017). On the other hand, social robots do have 
more capacity for agency, which Broadbent (2017) and Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007) 
conceptualize as the ability to have self-control, memory, communication, and planning.  
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Indeed, granting agency to another has been found to limit dehumanization 
(Formanowicz et al., 2018). This follows the argument that the roots of racism — a form 
of dehumanization — primarily stem not from some fundamental dislike or hatred of a 
group, but from the racist’s desire to maintain their power and advantage over the 
marginalized group (Sivanandan, 1983, Garcia, 1996, Kendi, 2019). This argument aligns 
with the explanation put forth in Ferrari and colleagues’ (2016) “threat to human 
distinctiveness” hypothesis: that people hold more negative perceptions of agentic robots 
because they feel their human uniqueness is threatened. This argument is also supported 
when extrapolating from this study’s finding that those with a higher internal locus of 
control (e.g., who might be more threatened by a social robot’s agency) are less likely to 
humanize robots. At the same time, social robots necessarily must be agentic, and so it 
seems possible that people may cope with the relationality by dehumanizing the robot, in 
order to maintain their sense of human hierarchy. 
A fair question at this point would be to ask, who cares if people dehumanize, or 
fail to humanize, robots? One could argue, too, that ontologically and definitionally they 
are not human, and therefore dehumanizing them — meaning, declining to humanize 
them — is the appropriate response. In the context of social robots in particular, by dint 
of their non-human nature, to dehumanize them would mean to maintain their ontological 
status and ensuing perceptions and treatment of them as non-human. This dissertation 
does not argue for robot humanization. However, if the tendency will be to dehumanize 
social robots, then the way they are designed in terms of their physical appearance and 
the roles that they inhabit must be critically dissected to ensure that dehumanization of 
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human traits is not reinforced or transferred from human-robot interactions to human-
human interactions.  
If there is no biological or physiological reason for a particular human trait to 
exist in a social robot, then its presence must only be for heuristic and relational purposes 
— as a way to categorize and understand the robot. As such, its presence would reinforce 
the most dehumanizing aspects of the traits themselves, reducing them to cues that define 
the entity, rather than a single aspect of that entity. Minority racial and ethnic groups, 
women, and other groups marginalized on the basis of “different” characteristics (such as 
religion or culture) already face dehumanization around the world (Haslam, 2006, 
Haslam & Loughnan, 2014, Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016). If only an aesthetic choice, 
the ascription of these types of traits onto robots would emphasize their physicality, 
which could lead to reinforcing objectifying and dehumanizing responses to certain traits. 
Indeed, while their study did not explicitly look at dehumanization, Eyssel and 
Kuchenbrandt (2012) found that in-group / out-group dynamics manifested when merely 
naming a robot. People were more likely to anthropomorphize (e.g., attribute mind and 
warmth) to a humanoid robot with a name congruent with subjects’ nationality, compared 
to the same humanoid robot with a nationally incongruent name. While these findings 
reveal existing tendencies to apply in-group / out-group biases to a robot, one could 
extrapolate how repeated exposure to an “out-group” robot may further entrench, rather 
than challenge, these beliefs. 
This possibility is particularly salient with gender, given extant research on 
people’s predilections for objectifying and dehumanizing others, and particularly women. 
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Specifically, as reviewed by Haslam and Loughnan (2014), studies have shown that when 
women and men’s bodies are made more visually salient and sexualized, people 
dehumanize them more (Loughnan et al., 2010). Further, sexualized women are 
instinctively processed visually as objects instead of people (Bernard et al., 2012). 
Finally, studies have found that people dehumanize women more when focused on their 
appearance instead of their personhood (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009, Heflick, 
Goldenberg, Cooper, & Puvia, 2011). This effect of personhood on dehumanization is an 
important point. A social robot is not a person, and as of yet has not been given any kind 
of personhood, and the descriptive findings in this dissertation, particularly regarding 
rights entitlement, suggest that we are a long way off from viewing social robots as a type 
of “person.” Thus, when social robots display female traits, there is no alternative 
“personhood” to buffer against objectifying that female robot. As such, ascribing physical 
female traits to a social robot might reinforce the baser human instincts of objectification.  
Ultimately the concern, in the example of female robots, is that the development 
or reinforcement of dehumanizing tendencies via human-robot interactions would then 
manifest in human-human interactions. Indeed, though this has not been causally 
demonstrated, studies have found links between dehumanizing tendencies and more 
aggressive behavior: men who dehumanized women were found to be more sexually 
aggressive (Rudman & Mescher, 2012, in Haslam & Loughnan, 2014), and 
dehumanization in video games has been proposed as an explanation for the effects of 
violent video games on general aggressiveness (Greitemeyer & McLatchie, 2011, in 
Haslam & Loughnan, 2014).  
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Therefore, the roles that social robots might inhabit must be considered in tandem 
with considerations of their appearance. If the tendency is to dehumanize robots, who 
take on certain tasks or roles in daily life, then humans who also perform those tasks may 
be at risk of similar dehumanization. Depending on the social robot’s physical 
appearance (e.g., male vs. female), a certain status could augment or suppress these 
tendencies. Take the example of an assistant, which is already an inferior position that 
can be more easily instrumentalized and thus dehumanized. As discussed above, and 
assistive female robot may reinforce notions that women belong in supplicative roles. In 
turn, female humans who occupy assistive positions may be dehumanized further because 
new interaction norms that have evolved with robot assistants are applied to the female 
assistants, following Gambino and colleagues’ (2020) argument that people develop 
specific scripts with which to navigate technology. As scripts for human-social-robot 
interaction develop, conventions will be established that drive norms for that interaction. 
Thus, as social robots develop, consideration should be given to not only the social 
robot’s physical appearance but also its relative positioning to people. 
Summary: Why We should Care about Robot (de)Humanization 
The premise of this dissertation was to explore dimensions of robot humanization, 
considering both sides of the process: the robot’s technological features and the human’s 
individual traits. This approach acknowledges that technological design can influence 
people’s behavior, but that it is not the sole determinant. People have the agency to, and 
do, use various technologies according to their personal needs, whether functional, 
expressive, or some combination therein. However, in the case of social robots 
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specifically, the capacity for agency is not one-sided: they are a technology created with 
the intent to act autonomously. This raises questions for humans not only of use but also 
of relationality and ontology: “using” a social robot necessarily means interacting with it 
as one might another living entity, which presents new challenges to understanding what 
the technology is and what role it should take in our lives.  
Some have proposed treating social robots as a form of “quasi-other” (Sandry, 
2018) in order to retain the ontological boundaries in the human — nonhuman hierarchy 
while acknowledging their heightened social capacity. Such a distinction would 
categorize the robot as somewhat-like-us but not of us. Given these boundaries, 
consideration must be given for the implications of making a robot appear of (some of) us 
if we never intend to treat it that way.  
This dissertation’s findings show that at this moment, there is little evidence that 
people intend to treat robots as equivalent beings with similar moral standing. Although 
there also appeared to be little evidence that the robot’s human-aping traits had an 
influence on humanizing perceptions, this lack of significance could be viewed as an 
opportunity to set design precedents now that are prosocial and/or will mitigate possible 
harm in the future.  
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APPENDIX A. DETAILED METHODS AND RESULTS OF STUDIES 1 AND 2 
 
Methods 
The first survey was conducted from May – June 2018 (N = 1,158). It contained a 
between-subjects experiment, in which respondents were randomly exposed to different 
images of a robot: an agender humanoid (e.g., more mechanical-appearing robot); a 
female android (e.g., more human-appearing robot); and a male android. The type of 
robot seen was included as a control in the models of individual trait predictors. The four 
outcome variables measured general and social attitudes about robots. General attitudes, 
adapted from Katz and Halpern (2014), included two measures: “cyberdystopianism” (6 
items, α = .73) and “robotphobia” (6 items, α = .83) (Katz & Halpern, 2014). Social 
perceptions of robots encompassed two measures: “robot liking” (7 items, α = .90; Katz 
& Halpern, 2014) and “imagined relational closeness” (12 items, Cronbach α = .97), 
which was adapted from Dibble, Levine, and Park’s (2012) “Unidimensional 
Relationship Closeness Scale (URCS)” and modified to replace the human relationship 
indicated in the items with an imagined relationship with one’s robot. 
The second survey was conducted from February – March 2019 (N = 2,254). It 
contained a similar between-subjects experiment as survey 1, though the stimuli differed. 
Rather than being presented with images of robots, respondents were shown text 
descriptions of autonomous, human-like robots that differed only in the type of pronoun 
used (e.g., he, she, and it). The outcome variables remained the same as described above 
for survey 1. This second survey also included a section measuring attitudes towards AI 
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defined more broadly: “Artificially Intelligent (AI) agents are smart computers that put 
into action decisions that they make by themselves.” Respondents were asked to imagine 
an AI agent in a range of roles — similar to a social distance scale — and indicate how 
comfortable they would feel with these scenarios. For example, “An AI agent as the 
leader of your country.” The index was adapted from Ericsson research (2017) and 
included additional roles to create an 8-item index for comfort with AI in the following 
roles: country leader, town mayor, company leader, work manager, work advisor, co-
worker, personal assistant, and therapist. An exploratory factor analysis revealed a bi-
dimensional scale: “AI power” (4 items, α = .97) and “AI peer” (3 items, α = .87), and so 
these were treated as two distinct variables for attitudes towards AI. The individual trait 
variables remained consistent from survey 1 to survey 2 with a few exceptions. 
Experience Traits 
Perceived Technology Competence (PTC) in both surveys was adapted from Katz 
and Halpern (2014). PTC is a 7-item, five-point Likert-type scale (strongly disagree to 
“strongly agree”) that includes statements like “I feel technology in general is easy to 
operate” and “It is easy for me to use my computer to communicate with others” (α = .87, 
M = 3.59, SD = .83). For survey 2, “robot phobia” (Katz & Halpern, 2014) was used as a 
proxy for technology anxiety, which was included in the model to measure AI comfort. 
Given the amorphous nature of AI, which is technically a software that can be present in 
a range of applications, we used a physical instantiation of AI — a robot — to measure 
anxiety around this kind of/class of technology. Neither survey included measures of 
prior experience with or exposure to robot or AI technology, which was a limitation 
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given the literature showing this as an important variable, and will be included in the 
present study. 
The second study also included measures of “communication apprehension,” 
adapted from McCroskey’s (1982) “Personal Report of Communication Apprehension 
(PRCA)” scale. PRCA is a 24-item scale that can be divided into four different types of 
communication apprehension. Each 6-item subscale measures apprehension distinct 
contexts: a group setting, a meeting, in a dyad (e.g., interpersonal), and giving a speech. 
Communication apprehension in a group includes statements like “I dislike participating 
in group discussions” and “Generally, I am comfortable while participating in group 
discussions” (reverse-coded), (α = .89, M = 2.70, SD = .94). Communication 
apprehension in a meeting includes statements like “Generally, I am nervous when I have 
to participate in a meeting” and “I am calm and relaxed when I am called upon to express 
an opinion at a meeting” (reverse-coded), (α = 0.92, M = 2.70, SD = .99). Interpersonal 
communication apprehension includes statements like “Ordinarily I am very tense and 
nervous in conversations” and “I have no fear of speaking up in conversations” (reverse-
coded) (α = .90, M = 2.54, SD = .89). Finally, communication apprehension when giving 
a speech includes statements like “Certain parts of my body feel very tense and rigid 
while I am giving a speech” and “I face the prospect of giving a speech with confidence” 
(reverse-coded), (α = .91, (M = 2.97, SD = 1.03). Items were recoded such that higher 
values corresponded to higher communication apprehension. 
Personality Traits 
Indices for extraversion and neuroticism (used in both surveys) were adapted 
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from Eysenck, Eysenck, and Barrett (1985) and measured on a five-point, Likert-type 
scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The 12-item extraversion scale (α = 
.92) asked respondents to respond how much the agree with statements like “I enjoy 
meeting new people” and “I tend to keep in the background on social occasions” 
(reverse-coded) (M = 3.20, SD = .80). The 12-item neuroticism scale (α = .94) included 
statements like “I would call myself tense or ‘highly strung’” and “I worry too long after 
an embarrassing experience” (M = 2.70, SD = .95). 
“Locus of control” was measured by a 6-item adapted scale from Rotter’s (1966) 
original 13-item scale (α = .76), again measured on a five-point, Likert-type scale 
(“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). Higher values corresponded to a higher internal 
locus of control, with statements such as “When I make plans, I am almost certain I can 
make them work” and “I do not have enough control over the direction my life is taking” 
(reverse-coded) (M = 3.54, SD = .71). 
Robot Features 
As mentioned above, in both surveys, participants were presented with an 
example of a robot and asked to imagine that robot when answering the dependent 
measures of robot perceptions. One of these was a subjective measure of perceived robot-
human likeness (8 items, Cronbach α = .91), which measured the extent to which 
participants perceived human qualities in the robot. Adapted from Katz and Halpern 
(2014), it included statements such as “Most robots are capable of understanding what 
humans say”, "Robots have their own personalities”, “Robots can have feelings”, and 




All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics. To determine the 
influence of individual traits, a series of hierarchical OLS regression models were 
constructed. The models of robot perceptions contained four blocks: robot features 
(manipulation and perceived human-likeness), demographics, personality traits, and 
experience traits. The model of AI perceptions contained three blocks: demographics, 
personality traits, and experience traits. 
Results 
Robots Perceptions 
General attitudes about robots 
Across both studies, men demonstrated higher cyberdystopia (β = -.08, p < .01, β 
= -.06, p < .05). In study 1 (see Table A.1), those who were older (β = .11, p < .01) and 
had a higher income (β = .12, p < .01) were more cyberdystopic, while education 
predicted less cyberdystopia in study 1 (β = -.07, p < .05) but higher cyberdystopia in 
study 2 (β = .05, p < .05). Consistent across both studies, those who were more neurotic 
(β = .29, p < .001, β = .16, p < .001) had more cyberdystopia. In study 2 (see Table A.2), 
extraversion (β = .08, p < .01) was related to higher cyberdystopia, while those who 
perceived themselves as more technologically competent were less cyberdystopic. 
Perceived human-likeness also mattered: those who perceived the robot as more human-
like had higher cyberdystopia (β = .30, p < .001, β = .17, p < .001) 
There were some similar trends with robotphobia: Those who were older (β = .07, 
p < .05) and wealthier (β = .07, p < .05) in study 1 had higher robot phobia, though it 
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should be noted that the first two blocks in study 1’s regression were not significant, 
suggesting poor model fit. Individual traits across both studies appeared to be the most 
important for predicting robot phobia. Extraverts (β = .10, p < .01, β = .060, p < .01) and 
neurotics (β = .38, p < .001, β = .19, p < .001) were more robot-phobic. In study 2, those 
with a higher locus of control were less robot-phobic (β = -.14, p < .01). One’s perceived 
technology competence was negatively related to robot phobia: those who were more 
competent showed less phobia (β = -.10, p < .01, β = -.14, p < .001). Interestingly, the 
robots’ features only mattered in study 2: those who perceived more human-likeness had 
less robot phobia (β = -.21, p < .001).  
Social attitudes towards robots 
As the regression models make clear, perceived robot-human likeness was a 
critical component of social attitudes towards robots. In both studies 1 (Table A.1) and 2 
(Table A.2), human-likeness was a strong predictor of robot liking (β = .60, p < .001, β = 
.64, p < .001) and imagined relational closeness (β = .65, p < .001, β = .67, p <.001). 
Robot features (type and perceived human-likeness) explained a majority of the variance 
in social attitudes, in stark comparison with general attitudes: 14.7% (study 1) and 4.4% 
(study 2) of cyberdystopianism was explained by robot type and perceived human-
likeness, while only 0.4% and 2.9% of robot phobia was explained by these variables in 
studies 1 and 2, respectively. Comparatively, robot features explained 47.2% (study 1) 
and 46.2% (study 2) of the variance in robot liking and 56.2% (study 1) and 54.5% (study 
2) of the variance in imagined relational closeness. 
Individual traits were less pertinent for these models. In study 1, income (β = .07, p < .01) 
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was a weak predictor of robot liking, and education (β = .06, p < .001) weakly predicted 
robot liking in study 2. Those with a higher internal locus of control had lower robot 
liking (β = -.057, p < .05) and imagined relational closeness (β = -.10, p < .001) in study 
1; in study 2, the relationship disappeared for robot liking but remained for imagined 
relational closeness (β = -.11, p < .001). Across both studies, extraversion was a positive 
predictor of imagined relational closeness (β = .05, p < .05, β = .07, p < .001), and in 
study 2, those who were more neurotic had slightly higher robot liking (β = .05, p < .05) 
and imagined relational closeness (β = .04, p < .05). Finally, perceived technology 
competence was a consistent positive predictor of social attitudes, particularly for robot 
















Block 1: Robot features 
Agender robot -.04 (.05) -.04 (.06) -.03 (.05) -.05 (.05)* 
Male robot -.02 (.05) .03 (.06) .05 (.05)* .03 (.05) 
Human-likeness .30 (.02)*** -.05 (.03) .60 (.02)*** .65 (.03)*** 
ΔR2 14.7% 0.4% 47.2% 56.2%*** 
Block 2: Demographics 
Gender (male = 0, female 
= 1) 
-.08 (.04)** .01 (.05) -.13 (.04)*** -.12 (.05)*** 
Age .11 (.001)** .07 (.002)* .03 (.001) -.02 (.001) 
Race/ethnicity .06 (.02)* -.002 (.03) .04 (.02) .03 (.02) 
Income .12 (.02)*** .07 (.02)* .07 (.02)** .02 (.02) 
Education -.07 (.02)* -.06 (.02) .02 (.02) .03 (.02) 
ΔR2 1.3% 0.8% 3.0% 2.3%*** 
Block 3: Personality traits 
Extraversion .05 (.03) .10 (.04)** -.002 (.03) .05 (.03)* 
Neuroticism .29 (.03)*** .38 (.03)*** .04 (.03) .04 (.03) 
Locus of control -.02 (.04) .06 (.05) -.06 (.04)* -.10 (.04)*** 
ΔR2 6.9% 9.7%*** 0.8% 1.4%*** 
Block 4: Technology experience 
Perceived tech 
competence 
-.01 (.03) -.10 (.04)** .19 (.03)*** .09 (.03)*** 
ΔR2 0.0% 0.7%*** 2.6% 0.6%*** 
Total adjusted R2 22.0% 10.6% 53.6% 60.0% 

















Block 1: Robot features 
Agender robot .04 (.04) -.04 (.04) .04 (.03)* .02 (.04) 
Male robot .04 (.03) -.02 (.04) .03 (.03)* .01 (.03) 
Human-likeness .17 (.02)*** -.21 (.02)*** .64 (.02)*** .67 (.02)*** 
ΔR2 4.4%*** 2.9%*** 46.2%*** 54.5%*** 
Block 2: Demographics 
Gender (male = 
0, female = 1) 
-.06 (.03)* .077 (.033)** -.077 (.029)*** -.106 (.030)*** 
Age -.05 (.001)  .00 (.001) .02 (.001) .02 (.001) 
Race/ethnicity .03 (.01) .00 (.02) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) 
Income .002 (.01) .04 (.01) .02 (.01) -.002 (.01) 
Education .05 (.01)* .04 (.01) .06 (.01)** .001 (.01) 
ΔR2 0.9% 1.4%*** 2.0%*** 1.5%*** 
Block 3: Personality traits 
Extraversion .0076 (.020)** .094 (.022)*** -.01 (.02) .07 (.02)*** 
Neuroticism .155 (.020)*** .199 (.022)*** .05 (.02)* .04 (.02)* 
Locus of control -.018 (.025) --.143 (.028)*** .001 (.02) -.11 (.03)*** 
ΔR2 2.2% 7.6%*** 0.2%*** 1.7%*** 
Block 4: Experience trait 
Perceived tech 
competence 
-.05 (.02)* -.14 (.02)*** .13 (.02)*** .10 (.02)*** 
ΔR2 0.2% 0.8%*** 1.3%*** 0.7%*** 
Total adjusted R2 7.2% 12.2% 49.3% 58.1% 
Notes: N = 2,254, listwise deletion; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Relationship between general and social attitudes 
The similar positive relationships between both extraversion and neuroticism and 
general and social attitudes were somewhat unexpected. Extraversion and neuroticism are 
negatively correlated (r = -.24, p < .001); however, they showed similar patterns with the 
dependent measures, all positively related (seen in the regression results). While one 
might expect neuroticism to predict higher cyberdystopianism and robot phobia, one 
might then expect an inversion with robot liking and imagined relational closeness, which 
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was not the case. Certainly neuroticism’s predictive power was weaker with social 
attitudes, but it remained a positive relationship. In correlations, interesting dynamics 
emerged between extraversion, neuroticism and the dependent measures. Interestingly, 
while robot phobia was negatively related to the social attitudes about robots (liking (r = -
.19, p < .001) and imagined relational closeness (r = -.16, p < .001), cyberdystopianism is 
positively related to liking (r = .27, p < .001) and imagined relational closeness (r = .25, p 
< .001). This indicates that being generally pessimistic about robots’ roles in society is 
not necessarily mutually exclusive with personal feelings towards robots. Indeed, it may 
be the case that someone’s capacity for liking or imagining a relationship with a robot 
informs their pessimistic view of robots in society at large.  
AI Perceptions 
In addition to robot perceptions, study 2 also measured perceptions of AI. As 
described above, respondents were given a brief definition of an “AI agent” as “smart 
computers that put into action decisions they make by themselves,” and then they were 
asked their level of comfort with such an AI in a range of roles, from very powerful (e.g., 
country leader) to supplicative (e.g., personal assistant.” Overall, the sample was not 
comfortable with AI in most roles presented (see Figure 1). For ease of presenting these 
items descriptively, categories were collapsed: “not comfortable at all” and “somewhat 
uncomfortable” into “uncomfortable,” and “somewhat comfortable” and “very 
comfortable” into “comfortable.” 
There is a clear inverse pattern of respondents’ AI comfort and the amount of 
power an AI agent would wield in a given role. At least 70% of participants were 
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uncomfortable with an AI as a country leader, mayor, company leader, or manager. 
Discomfort drops considerably when the hierarchy levels off or inverts: only 58% and 
47% of participants would be uncomfortable with an AI as a work advisor or co-worker, 
respectively. And the proportion of participants comfortable with AI as an assistant 
(39%) surpasses (though just barely) those uncomfortable with AI in that supplicative 
role (36%). 
Construct of AI comfort 
An exploratory factor analysis was first conducted to reveal whether “AI 
Comfort” was a uni- or multi-dimensional construct. The factorability of the eight items 
was considered appropriate because each correlated with the other above .30; 
additionally, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .92 (well above 
the recommended .70 value), and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, X2(28) = 
19494.54, p < .001. Because our goal was to uncover any latent constructs, a principal 
axis factoring (PAF) extraction and Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization rotation was 
used.  
The PAF indicated that two factors could be extracted: the first factor’s initial 
Eigenvalue was 5.77, explaining 72.15% of the variance, and the second factor’s initial 
Eigenvalue was 1.04, explaining an additional 12.96% of the variance. The resulting 
pattern matrix indicates one very clear emergent factor of AI in positions of power — 
leader of country (.95; correlates with first factor .91), mayor of town (.97; correlates 
with first factor .95), leader of company (.95; correlates with first factor .96), manager 
(.86; correlates with first factor .93). The second factor that emerged could best be 
 
130 
interpreted as AI as a peer — a co-worker (.84; correlates with second factor .89) and a 
personal assistant (.88; correlate with second factor .81). Two items in the original 8-item 
index are more difficult to place cleanly in either factor. They more closely fit with the 
second factor, but the loadings are weak: AI as a therapist (.47; correlates with second 
factor .75) and as a work advisor (.57; correlates with second factor .81). These two roles 
could exert some power over people, but not as clearly indicated as the other power 
contexts. However, the structure matrix suggests that one of these items — AI as a work 
advisor — fits well in the second factor, as it correlates .81 with the AI as a peer factor, 
similar to the co-worker (.89) and personal assistant (.81) correlations. Therefore, for the 
purposes of a clean analysis, the AI therapist item was not included in either factors, and 
suggests the need for further scale development that takes into account nuances of power 
distance in various roles: it may be the case that an “AI comfort” construct should have 
three dimensions, rather than the two we uncovered.  
Explaining variance in AI comfort 
Given the results of the EFA, above, two “AI comfort” variables were created: 
“AI power” (α = .97) and “AI peer” (α = .87). First order analyses (t-tests and 
correlations) revealed that some demographic traits were related to perceptions, 
particularly gender (with men significantly more comfortable with AI than women), as 
well as education and income (both positively correlated). There were no significant 
relationships found with race in either of the dependent variables.  
There were some similar relationships between personal traits and comfort with 
the two AI roles (see Table A.3). Those who were more extraverted were more 
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comfortable with both AI roles; however, neuroticism was only positively related to “AI 
power.” Perhaps not surprisingly, a higher internal locus of control was negatively related 
to comfort with both roles, though notably much stronger to an AI in power. Conversely, 
higher robot phobia was more strongly and negatively related to “AI peer” than it was to 
“AI power.” Those with higher perceived technology competence were more comfortable 
with an AI as a peer and, to a slightly lesser extent, with an AI in power. 
There were also some interesting differences between respondents’ 
communication apprehension and their comfort with either an AI peer or an AI in power. 
For an AI peer, those with higher communication apprehension in a large and small 
group settings and with giving a speech were less comfortable. For an AI in power, 
higher communication apprehension was only related to less comfort with public 
speaking; those with higher communication apprehension in conversation were more 
comfortable with an AI in power. 






















.16** .02 -.12*** -.10*** -.09*** -.04 -.10*** .27*** -.25*** 
AI 
power 
.14** .12*** -.32*** .01 .02 .07** -.05* .19*** -.08*** 
Note: Correlations reported are Pearson’s r. “CA” indicates communication apprehension; 
“PTC” indicated perceived technology competence; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
To further explore how these variables contribute to our understanding of 
people’s comfort with AI, two hierarchical OLS regressions were run, with “AI power” 
and “AI peer” as the dependent variables and comprised of three blocks: (1) demographic 
 
132 
traits (age, gender, education, income); (2) personality traits (extraversion, neuroticism, 
and locus of control; and (3) personal experience traits (communication apprehension, 
perceived technology competence, and robot phobia).  
Contributors to comfort with AI in power 
All three blocks in the model were significant at p < .001 (1: F(4,2249) = 25.61, 
2: F(7,2246) = 63.03, 3: F(13,2240) = 42.77), and overall the model explained 19.4% of 
the variance in comfort with an AI in power. 
As can be seen in Table A.4, personality traits contributed the most explanatory 
power: the higher someone’s internal locus of control, the less comfortable they were 
with AI (β = -.37, p < .001). Those who were more extraverted (β = .19, p < .001) and 
less neurotic (β = -.07, p < .05) were more comfortable with an AI in power. 
Demographic (4.4% and personal experiential (3.5%) traits contributed similar amounts 
of explanatory power: Gender differences remained significant, with women less 
comfortable than men with AI (β = -.06, p < .01), and while still significant, age was 
weakly predictive of AI comfort (β = -.06, p < .01). Respondents that perceived 
themselves as more technologically competent (β = .14, p < .001) and less robot phobic 
(β = -.12, p < .001) were more comfortable with “AI power.” Communication 
apprehension in different contexts again had differing effects: those who were more 
apprehensive communicating interpersonally (β = .16, p < .001) were more comfortable, 
while those who were more apprehensive giving a speech (β = -.12, p < .001) were less 




Table A.4: Hierarchical linear regression predicting comfort with AI in power 
 B (SE) β 
Constant 3.69 (.34)  
Block 1: Demographics 
Age -.004 (.002) -.06** 
Gender (1=male, 2=female) -.14 (.05) -.06** 
Income -.01 (.02) -.01 
Education .01 (.01) .01 
ΔR2 = 4.4%*** 
Block 2: Personality traits 
Extraversion .27 (.04) .19*** 
Neuroticism -.09 (.03) -.07** 
Locus of control -.61 (.04) -.37*** 
ΔR2 = 12.1%***  
Block 3: Experience traits 
Communication apprehension - group .04 (.05) .03 
Communication apprehension - meeting .01 (.05) .01 
Communication apprehension – interpersonal .21 (.05) .16*** 
Communication apprehension – speech -.16 (.04) -.14*** 
Perceived technology competence .14 (.03) .10*** 
Robot phobia -.17 (.03) -.12*** 
ΔR2 = 3.5%*** 
Total adjusted R2 = 19.4% 




Contributors to comfort with an AI peer 
All three blocks in this model were also significant at p < .001 (1: F(4,2249) = 
27.39, 2: F(7,2246) = 39.39, 3: F(13,2240) = 37.69), and overall the model explained 
17.5% of the variance in comfort with AI as a peer. Different from the “AI power” 
model, the personal experience traits contributed the most explanation (9.6%), while 
personality (3.7%) and demographic (4.6%) traits had roughly similar explanatory power.  
 This model also showed similar relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables, though similar to what was found with the bivariate correlational 
analysis, although some of the predictors of comfort with AI as peer varied in their 
relative strength (see Table A.5). In particular, locus of control remained significant but 
was not as strongly predictive (β = -.19, p < .001), and neuroticism was not a significant 
predictor of comfort with an AI peer. Male (β = -.10, p < .001) younger (β = -.06, p < 
.05), and extraverted respondents (β = .09, p < .01) continued to be more comfortable 
with AI as a peer in this model.  
Interpersonal communication apprehension was the only communicative trait that 
contributed to comfort with an AI peer: those who were more apprehensive 
conversationally were more comfortable (β = .11, p < .01). Respondents with more 
perceived technological competence had higher comfort with an AI peer (β = .18, p < 
.001). Finally, robot phobia was a significant predictor of “AI peer” comfort (β = -.25, p 




Table A.5. Predictors of comfort with AI as peer 
 B (SE) Beta (β) 
Constant 4.08 (.35)  
Age -.004 (.002) -.055* 
Gender (1=male, 2=female) -.22 (.05) -.097*** 
Income -.002 (.02) -.003 
Education .03 (.02) .037Ϯ  
ΔR2 = 4.6%*** 
Extraversion .14 (.04) .09** 
Neuroticism -.01 (.04) -.01 
ΔR2 = 2.0%*** 
Locus of control -.32 (.04) -.19*** 
Communication apprehension - group -.07 (.05) -.05 
Communication apprehension - meeting -.06 (.06) -.05 
Communication apprehension – interpersonal .15 (.05) .11** 
Communication apprehension – speech -.03 (.04) -.02 
Perceived technology competence .25 (.03) .18*** 
Robot phobia -.39 (.03) -.25*** 
ΔR2 = 11.3%*** 
Total adjusted R2 = 17.5% 
Note: B (SE) = unstandardized regression coefficient with the standard error 
presented in parentheses; β = standardized regression coefficient; Ϯp < .10 *p < 
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Figure C.12. Male android robot subordinate. 
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APPENDIX D. SURVEY MEASURES 
Robot-human likeness (7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree): 
Robots are independent, self-contained beings, not like puppets who need to have 
someone pulling their strings.  
Robots are able to recognize human emotions.  
I do not think it is right to mistreat or abuse a robot.  
Most robots are capable of understanding what humans say.  
Robots have their own personalities.  
Robots can have feelings.  
Most robots can have emotions of their own.  
 
Robot liking (7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree): 
If robots had emotions, I would be able to make friends with them.  
I would feel relaxed talking with robots.  
Robots can contribute to my personal happiness.  
I would like to live with robots.  






How often, if at all, have you have contact with an industrial robot? [Never – Very often, 
6-point scale] 
I would like robots to handle my physically laborious tasks for me.  
I would feel more independent with assistance from a robot rather than a human.  
I would prefer to interact with a machine that looked like a robot, rather than one with humanoid 
appearance.  
 
Robot rights (7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree): 
Human rights should be extended to robots.  
Robots and people should be allowed to marry.  
Robots should be allowed to adopt children.  
Robots should be allowed to say whatever they want.  
Robots should be allowed to vote.  
Robots should be allowed to become citizens of a country.  
Robots should be allowed to serve on juries.  
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How often, if at all, have you had contact with a domestic robot like a robotic vacuum of 
lawn mower? [Never – Very often, 6-point scale] 
How often, if at all, have you had contact with a social robot that is autonomous and can 
interact and communicate with humans? [Never – Very often, 6-point scale] 
 
Robot mediated experience 
How would you generally describe the relationship between humans and robots in those 
movies or TV shows? [7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree]: 
Robots are rather against humans 
Robots help humans 
Robots and humans are friends 
Robots and humans work together 
Robots are a danger to humans 
Robots are a threat to the human race 
 
Perceived technology competence (7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree): 
I enjoy using my mobile phone to communicate with people.  
I feel technology in general is easy to operate.  
I am usually the first among my friends to use and/or purchase a new technology when 
it comes out.  
I am comfortable with the technical features of my mobile phone.  
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It is easy for me to use my computer to communicate with others.  
I keep up with the latest technological developments in my areas of interest.  
Other people come to me for advice on new technologies.  
 
Locus of control (7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree): 
In my life, good luck is more important than hard work for success.  
When I make plans, I am almost certain I can make them work.  
My plans hardly ever work out, so planning makes me unhappy.  
I do not have enough control over the direction my life is taking.  
I leave to chance what happens in my life.  
When I try to do something, fate determines what actually happens.  
 
Innovativeness (7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree): 
I am usually one of the last people in my group to accept something new.  
I am reluctant about adopting new ways of doing things until I see them working for 
people around me.  
I must see other people using new innovations before I will consider them.  
I often find myself skeptical of new ideas.  
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I consider myself to be creative and original in my thinking and behavior.  
I am an inventive kind of person.  
I find it stimulating to be original in my thinking and behavior.  
 
Extraversion (7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree): 
I am a talkative person.  
I am often lively.  
I enjoy meeting new people.  
I usually take the initiative in making new friends.  
I can easily get some life into a rather dull party.  
I like plenty of bustle and excitement around me.  
Other people think of me as being very lively.  
I tend to keep in the background on social occasions.  
I am mostly quiet when I am with other people.  
 
Neuroticism (7-point scale, strongly agree – strongly disagree): 
My mood goes up and down a lot.  
At times I can feel "just miserable" for no reason.  
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I would call myself a nervous person.  
I am a worrier.  
I would call myself tense or "highly strung."  
I worry too long after an embarrassing experience.  
I suffer from feelings of anxiousness.  
I often feel lonely.  




APPENDIX E. EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF A “ROBOT RIGHTS” 
SCALE 
 
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 19-item “robot rights” items. 
As a first step to determine the suitability of factoring the items, the correlation matrix 
was examined. From this, five items (#s: 1, 2, 13, 14, 17, see Table E.1) were identified 
for removal, as they consistently correlated weakly (< .30) with the other items; 
correlations above 0.30 demonstrate enough commonality for creating factors 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). To further confirm appropriateness of the scale’s 
factorability, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity were evaluated. KMO measures the shared variance in the 
items (Beavers et al., 2013) and in this case was .94, well above the recommended 0.70 
minimum threshold and considered “marvelous” (Friel, n.d., in Beavers et al., 2013). 
Bartlett’s test, which evaluates whether the correlation matrix is a singular matrix (e.g., 
contains no or infinite factors, the null hypothesis) or can be explained by linear 
combinations (e.g., factors) (Beavers et al., 2013), shows that the matrix contains factors 
(X2(91) = 11066.47, p < .001). Because the goal was to uncover the underlying construct 
of “robot rights,” a factor analysis, rather than a component analysis, was used.  
Specifically, the scale was factored using a principal axis factoring (PAF) 
extraction using an oblique (direct oblimin) rotation.3 The extraction showed three factors 
 
3 The Principal Axis Factoring extraction was used as opposed to Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation because PAF requires no assumptions for non-normal distribution (Beavers et al., 




with an Eigenvalue over 1, and the first factor, with an Eigenvalue of 7.25, explained 
52% of the variance. The second factor (Eigenvalue = 1.60) explained an additional 
11.40% of the variance, and the third factor (Eigenvalue = 1.03) explained another 7.35% 
of the variance. Looking first at the unrotated factor matrix, the 14 items loaded relatively 
strongly to the first factor, with all items related above 0.5. What becomes clear looking 
at the rotated solution is the emergence of an “enumerated rights” factor, seen in the 
loading for the items in factor 1. Five of the seven items load close to or above 0.80; one 
loads above 0.60; and one loads above 0.40 (importantly, this item does not load more 
strongly on the other two factors). The remaining two factors present components that are 
less robust and clearly delineated. Three items load onto the second factor above 0.50 
while only two items load most strongly to the third factor. For the item wordings and 
rotated factor loadings in the pattern matrix, see Table E.2.  
For conceptual clarity, therefore, the first factor, representing primarily the 
enumerated rights of the robot (such as voting, becoming citizens, having free speech), 
was created for the main dependent variable of “robot rights.” The PAF indicates that a 
robot rights construct may be multi-dimensional, but further scale elaboration and 
validation will be required. The retained component for this study represents enumerated 
rights, but the earlier dropped items and items comprising the second factor, in particular, 
 
Smirnov test, the null hypothesis of normal distribution was rejected (p < .001) for all items. An 
oblique rotation (promax) was selected instead of an orthogonal rotation (such as Varimax) based 
on the assumption that any factors within the overall scale would be correlated. Even if resulting 
factors end up being weakly related, oblique rotations can be used (Fabrigar et al., 1999, in 
Beavers et al., 2013). Orthogonal rotations assume that dimensions of a scale are uncorrelated, 
which is less likely generally in social science constructs (Beavers et al., 2013); in the particular 
case of rights attitudes, it seems improbable that the components would not be interrelated to 
some degree.  
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conceptually get more at the notion of autonomy and free will. Future work should 
expand on and test this potential dimension to provide a more well-rounded 




Table E.1. Original 19 scale items included in survey 
Human owners should have the right to destroy/kill their robots if they wish.* 
Robots should be programmed to do whatever their owners want, provided it isn't illegal or 
immoral.* 
Human rights should be extended to robots. 
Robots and people should be allowed to marry. 
Robots should be allowed to adopt children. 
Robots should be allowed to say whatever they want. 
Robots should be allowed to vote. 
Robots should be allowed to become citizens of a country. 
Robots should be allowed to kill people in certain contexts, such as during war. 
Robots should be allowed to shoot at someone invading a home. 
Robots should be allowed to serve on juries. 
It should be possible to charge robots with a crime. 
We must not build robots that seem like real humans.* 
Robots must always be under human control.* 
It is OK to create robots that appear to be people. 
If a robot's owner does something illegal, the robot should report it to the police. 
A robot should never report on its owner's activities.* 
A robot should be able to decide whether to report its owner for breaking the law. 
If a robot's owner does something wrong, the robot should report it to the authorities. 
Note: *asterisked items were removed after initial correlation matrix analysis due to weak 













 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Human rights should be 
extended to robots. 
.83   .80   .85 .48 .59 
Robots and people should be 
allowed to marry. 
.79   .88   .84 .36 .55 
Robots should be allowed to 
adopt children. 
.84   .92   .89 .42 .58 
Robots should be allowed to 
say whatever they want. 
.69   .44  .31 .67 .40 .62 
Robots should be allowed to 
vote. 
.82   .93   .88 .41 .55 
Robots should be allowed to 
become citizens of a country. 
.86   .85   .89 .47 .62 
Robots should be allowed to 
kill people in certain contexts, 
such as during war. 
.57  .51   .81 .46 .35 .77 
Robots should be allowed to 
shoot at someone invading a 
home. 
.59  .45   .73 .52 .34 .75 
Robots should be allowed to 
serve on juries. 
.77   .60   .75 .53 .57 
It should be possible to charge 
robots with a crime. 
.57   .32 .34  .51 .52 .41 
It is OK to create robots that 
appear to be people. 
.52     .33 .47 .35 .51 
If a robot's owner does 
something illegal, the robot 
should report it to the police. 
.58 .65   .90  .39 .87 .39 
A robot should never report on 
its owner's activities. 
         
A robot should be able to 
decide whether to report its 
owner for breaking the law. 
.66 .35   .58  .54 .72 .48 
If a robot's owner does 
something wrong, the robot 
should report it to the 
authorities. 
.59 .68   .94  .39 .90 .38 




APPENDIX F. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ALL DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
BY ROBOT TYPE. 
 
Table F.1. Descriptive statistics for humanizing perceptions of each robot 
 Robot-human likeness Robot liking Robot rights 
Male Android Superior (n = 98) 
M (SD) 
4.25 (1.29) 4.47 (1.33) 2.55 (1.38) 
Cronbach α .84 .91 .92 
Male Android Peer 
M (SD) (n = 97) 
4.29 (1.45) 4.35 (1.50) 2.96 (1.70) 
Cronbach α .92 .92 .95 
Male Android Assistant (n = 96) 4.04 (1.43) 4.20 (1.53) 2.56 (1.62) 
Cronbach α .87 .91 .94 
Male Humanoid Superior (n = 95) 4.26 (1.47) 4.45 (1.74) 2.90 (1.80) 
Cronbach α .89 .94 .95 
Male Humanoid Peer (n = 97) 3.93 (1.27) 4.31 (1.46) 2.51 (1.50) 
Cronbach α .84 .91 .93 
Male Humanoid Assistant (n = 99) 4.19 (1.23) 4.24 (1.37) 2.66 (1.56) 
Cronbach α .88 .87 .94 
Female Android Superior (n = 99) 4.27 (1.29) 4.18 (1.55) 2.59 (1.50) 
Cronbach α .87 .93 .92 
Female Android Peer (n = 96) 4.36 (1.46) 4.56 (1.50) 2.97 (1.71) 
Cronbach α .84 .93 .94 
Female Android Assistant (n = 99) 4.30 (1.46) 4.46 (1.53) 2.89 (1.73) 
Cronbach α .89 .92 .95 
Female Humanoid Superior (n = 98) 4.20 (1.35) 4.25 (1.39) 2.77 (1.68) 
Cronbach α .89 .90 .94 
Female Humanoid Peer (n = 99) 4.11 (1.14) 4.49 (1.28) 2.70 (1.52) 
Cronbach α .81 .89 .92 
Female Humanoid Assistant (n = 97) 4.35 (1.31) 4.61 (1.53) 2.75 (1.49) 
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